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VISUAL GUT PUNCH: PERSUASION, EMOTION,
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING OF
GRAPHIC DISCLOSURE
Ellen P. Goodman†
The ability of government to “nudge” with information mandates, or
merely to inform consumers of risks, is circumscribed by First Amendment
interests that have been poorly articulated. New graphic cigarette warning
labels supplied courts with the first opportunity to assess the informational
interests attending novel forms of product disclosures. The D.C. Circuit enjoined them as unconstitutional, compelled by a narrative that the graphic
labels converted government from objective informer to ideological persuader,
shouting its warning to manipulate consumer decisions. This interpretation
will leave little room for graphic disclosure and is already being used to challenge textual disclosure requirements (such as county-of-origin labeling) as
unconstitutional.
Graphic warning and the increasing reliance on regulation-by-disclosure present new free speech quandaries related to consumer autonomy, state
normativity, and speaker liberty. This Article examines the distinct goals of
product disclosure requirements and how those goals may serve to vindicate,
or to frustrate, listener interests. I argue that many disclosures, and especially warnings, are necessarily both normative and informative, expressing
value along with fact. It is not the existence of a norm that raises constitutional concern but rather the insistence on a controversial norm. Turning to
the means of disclosure, this Article examines how emotional and graphic
communication might change the constitutional calculus. Using autonomy
theory and the communications research on speech processing, I conclude
that disclosures do not bypass reason simply by reaching for the heart. If
large graphic labels are unconstitutional, it will be because of undue burden
on the speaker, not because they are emotionally powerful.
This Article makes the following distinct contributions to the compelled
commercial speech literature: critiques the leading precedent, Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, from a consumer autonomy standpoint;
brings to bear empirical communications research on questions of facticity
and rationality in emotional and graphic communications; and teases apart
and distinguishes among various free speech dangers and contributions of
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commercial disclosure mandates with a view towards informing policy, law,
and research.
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INTRODUCTION
The free speech implications of graphic and emotionally disturbing cigarette labels1 have split two federal appellate courts, with
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals striking down the labels on First
Amendment grounds.2 The courts disagreed on the government’s
power to persuade, the nature of warning through graphic images,
1
Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628
(June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141) [hereinafter Final Rule]. The Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) acted under the authority of a 2009 federal statute. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776, 1796
(codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 387–387t (2012)). See generally B. Ashby Hardesty, Jr., Note, Joe
Camel Versus Uncle Sam: The Constitutionality of Graphic Cigarette Warning Labels, 81 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2811 (2013) (describing the free speech issues surrounding cigarette labels).
2
Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir.
2012) (upholding statutory labeling requirement against a facial challenge); R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1221–22 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (striking down labels
adopted by the FDA).
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and the role of emotions in cognitive processing.3 How the law addresses these questions will shape regulation-by-disclosure and other
emerging policy strategies built on communicating with the public.
This Article assesses competing claims of autonomy and the public
interest, aided by the latest empirical research on emotional and cognitive processing of risk communication.
Any investigation of these issues must start with the recognition
that government often seeks simultaneously to inform and to influence consumer purchases by mandating product disclosures. Nutritional labels, toxic chemical disclosures, and cigarette warnings are
classic examples. Mandatory calorie disclosures figure in the war on
obesity.4 Social-change advocates have pressed for disclosure as a way
to reduce hormones in milk5 and mercury in landfills.6 There is
ongoing consideration of mandatory food labeling for genetically
modified organisms7 and product labeling for carbon “footprints.”8
The use of mandatory product disclosures is a species of what
Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler have called “nudges” that guide the
public towards more socially beneficial choices.9 An emerging consensus among researchers is that nudges are most effective when in3
Compare R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217 (characterizing the labels as “unabashed
attempts to evoke emotion (and perhaps embarrassment) and browbeat consumers into
quitting”), with Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 569 (“Facts [including those presented graphically] can disconcert, displease, provoke an emotional response, spark controversy, and
even overwhelm reason, but that does not magically turn such facts into opinions.”).
4
See, e.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 117–18 (2d
Cir. 2009) (upholding requirement that New York City restaurants list fast food calorie
counts); see also Lindsay F. Wiley, Rethinking the New Public Health, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
207, 209 (2012) (discussing information regulation in public health policy).
5
See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 1996) (Leval, J.,
dissenting) (discussing “frequent press commentary and debate” over the use of synthetic
hormones in dairy cows).
6
Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001); see also, e.g.,
Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1089, 1090 (2007) (“Mandatory disclosure has become a sort of ‘regulation-lite’ extolled
even by those who would ordinarily oppose regulation.”).
7
California’s Proposition 37 in 2012 would have required labels for many foods containing genetically modified organisms. Stacy Finz, Prop. 37: Genetic Food Labels Defeated,
SFGATE (Nov. 7, 2012, 10:27 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Prop-37-Geneticfood-labels-defeated-4014669.php.
8
See Jason J. Czarnezki, The Future of Food Eco-Labeling: Organic, Carbon Footprint, and
Environmental Life-Cycle Analysis, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 18–21 (2011) (discussing nascent
voluntary and mandatory programs in the United States and Europe for labeling consumer
products with information regarding carbon footprints).
9
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2009). Conservatives too have sought mandated disclosure, most notably in the form of mandatory fetal sonograms that are disclosed to abortion
patients. See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, What the Abortion Disclosure Cases Say About the Constitutionality of Persuasive Government Speech on Product Labels, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 855, 858 (2010);
John A. Robertson, Abortion and Technology: Sonograms, Fetal Pain, Viability, and Early Prenatal
Diagnosis, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 327, 329 (2011); see also Gary M. Lucas, Jr., Paternalism and
Psychic Taxes: The Government’s Use of Negative Emotions to Save Us from Ourselves, 22 S. CAL.
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formation is conveyed simply and at the point of consumer decision
making.10 With this in mind, nations are implementing graphic
front-of-pack nutritional labels11 and are considering the placement
of graphic warnings on high-fat foods.12 The future of product disclosures will not only be graphic but almost certainly digital as well, with
information delivered opportunistically through mobile devices.13
The future of product disclosure litigation is equally clear: it will
grow.14
The government’s ability to “nudge” with information mandates,
or merely to inform consumers of risks, is circumscribed by First
Amendment interests that have been poorly articulated in the relevant
law and commentary. New graphic cigarette warning labels supplied
courts with the first opportunity to assess the informational interests
attending new forms of product disclosures. Two opposing narratives
have emerged. One is that graphic and emotionally wrenching
images merely update textual labels that have been in place for a
half-century, providing consumers with full information about the
risks of smoking.15 The other narrative is that the graphic labels convert government from objective informer to ideological persuader,
INTERDISC. L.J. 227, 227–28 (2013) (describing the increasingly popular use of paternalistic
policies, especially to “provok[e] negative emotions such as fear, anxiety, or shame”).
10
See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 743 (2011) (explaining that “brief, simple, easy disclosures” have
the most impact on consumer decision making); see also ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM &
DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 57 (2007) (“Making information available at a time and place where users are accustomed to making decisions also maximizes the chances that information will become embedded.”).
11
See, e.g., Kristy L. Hawley et al., The Science on Front-of-Package Food Labels, 16 PUB.
HEALTH NUTRITION 430, 430 (2013); Nick Triggle, Food Labelling: Consistent System ‘to Start
Next Year,’ BBC NEWS (Oct. 24, 2012, 5:24 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health20050420 (describing the traffic-light food-labeling system, which displays the amount of
calories in a food product surrounded by a box of either green, yellow, or red, indicating
whether it is a high or low amount).
12
See Stacey Leasca, Canadian Doctors Call for Warning Labels on Junk Food, GLOBAL POST
(Oct. 24, 2012, 4:02 PM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/
canada/121024/canadian-doctors-calls-warning-labels-junk-food (reporting on proposal of
Ontario Medical Association).
13
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 600.302–12(b)(6) to (7) (2013) (establishing EPA guidelines
for the implementation of smartphone QR Codes on new vehicle fuel-economy labels to
provide customers with additional information on fuel economy).
14
The next big federal product labeling initiative—a 2013 USDA requirement that
producers label certain meat products with the countries of origin of where the source
animal was born, raised, and slaughtered—has been challenged on First Amendment
grounds. See Chris Morran, Big Meat Sues USDA over Country-of-Origin Labeling Requirement,
CONSUMERIST (July 10, 2013), http://consumerist.com/2013/07/10/big-meat-sues-usdaover-country-of-origin-labeling-requirement/; see also Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
No. 13-CV-01033 (KBJ), 2013 WL 4830778 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2013) (denying preliminary
injunction against labeling requirement on grounds that it probably satisfies Zauderer standard for mandatory disclosure).
15
See infra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.
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shouting its warning in order to manipulate consumer decisions.16
Resorting to legal doctrine that is by turns insufficient and incoherent, adherents of each position grapple with a series of binary choices:
that communication is informative or persuasive, emotional or rational. This kind of analysis blinks at the reality of communications in
which these characteristics coexist on a continuum.
This Article explores the informational interests at stake when
the government tries both to inform and to influence consumers and
how its use of emotional imagery affects the constitutional calculus. I
argue that the focus of the inquiry must return to the cornerstone of
commercial speech law: consumer autonomy. Drawing on the communications literature about emotional appeals and visual processing,
I show that the use of graphics and emotion need not render communication any less truthful or more ideological. The constitutional
analysis should focus more on the ends of the communication than
on the means. We should be most skeptical of mandatory disclosures
that insert the state into a matter of controversy, using its regulatory
power to advance a contested ideological position.
Parts I and II provide brief overviews, respectively, of the constitutional law of compelled commercial speech and the cigarette-labeling
controversy. Part III looks at the ends of product disclosure requirements and how they may serve to vindicate, or to frustrate, listener
interests. One of the conclusions is that warning, by its nature, is both
normative and informative, expressing value along with fact. It is not
the existence of a norm that raises constitutional concern but rather
the insistence on a controversial norm. Part IV turns to the means of
disclosure, examining the constitutional valance of emotional and
graphic speech. Here, I apply the communications and philosophical
literature to the central question in this matter: Has the government
bypassed consumers’ reason by reaching for their hearts? I will argue
that it has not. Ultimately, it is not my goal to defend or attack the
cigarette-labeling mandate—a policy choice of questionable utility.
Rather, it is to show that sweeping and often baseless conclusions
about the communicative function of product disclosures do not advance the constitutional values reflected in commercial speech
protections.
I
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF COMPELLED COMMERCIAL
DISCLOSURE
First Amendment doctrine is fairly clear on compelled noncommercial speech. A speech compulsion is treated the same as a speech re16

See infra notes 133–40 and accompanying text.
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striction.17 That is, the government can no more easily compel a
citizen to speak than it can muzzle her. It is strict scrutiny both ways.
The law is also fairly clear about the status of commercial speech restrictions: they are disfavored, although not as much as noncommercial
speech restrictions or compulsions.18 They receive intermediate scrutiny. Where the law is not well developed is in the area of compelled
commercial speech. The reasons for this, discussed below, have to do
with the distinctive speech interests the law seeks to protect in commercial speech cases: the informational interests of listeners rather
than the liberty interests of speakers.19 To the extent that listeners
benefit from having more information, compelled commercial speech
may cut in favor of First Amendment interests rather than against
them.
This Part sets out the background of commercial speech law, reviews the confused law on compelled commercial speech, and concludes with an analysis of the constitutional values implicated in this
corner of First Amendment law.
A. Commercial Speech Background
Product labels are commercial speech.20 Commercial speech
generally receives less First Amendment protection than noncommercial speech, although the gap has been steadily closing in recent
years.21 Until the late twentieth century, commercial speech fell entirely outside the protection of the First Amendment, much like the
speech of contracts and securities trading.22 This changed in 1976
with Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, which invalidated Virginia’s ban
on prescription-drug price advertising by pharmacists.23
17

See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
19
See infra notes 33–43 and accompanying text.
20
Commercial speech is defined as speech that “does no more than propose a commercial transaction.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)); see Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 473–74 (1989); cf. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–68 (1983)
(concluding that an advertisement that refers to a specific product and is motivated by the
speaker’s economic interests is commercial speech).
21
A number of justices appear ready to jettison the commercial speech distinction
altogether. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367–68 (2002) (collecting
cases and noting that at least five members of the Court have “expressed doubts about the
[commercial speech] analysis”); cf. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2665 (2011)
(comparing state law restricting pharmaceutical advertising to content-based restrictions
on noncommercial speech that is economically motivated).
22
See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 151 (2d ed. 2003).
23
425 U.S. at 770, 772 (1976); see also FARBER, supra note 22, at 151 (observing that
commercial advertising once “fell completely outside the scope of the First Amendment”
and that it was not until the mid-1970s that “commercial speech was brought firmly under
First Amendment protection”).
18

R
R
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Significantly, the challenge to the ban came not from the regulated speakers but from the potential “listeners” or consumers.24 The
Court held that the state could not deprive consumers of information
to save them from bad choices—in this case, the choice to buy cheap
drugs at the expense of quality.25 Leaning away from speaker rights,
the Court evinced little sympathy for the pharmacists but chose instead to vindicate listener interests in access to information. It emphasized that First Amendment protection was afforded to the two ends of
a communication, “to its source and to its recipients both.”26
This emphasis on the informational interests of listeners, as distinct from the liberty of speakers, provides the distinctive rationale for
commercial speech protection.27 In developing the commercial
speech doctrine, the Court has located the constitutional “concern for
commercial speech” in “the informational function of advertising.”28
B. Zauderer and Compelled Commercial Disclosures
This distinctive emphasis on listener interests is particularly evident in the treatment of compelled commercial speech.29 Where ordinary, noncommercial speech is concerned, a government
requirement to speak poses the very same First Amendment problem
24

425 U.S. at 753.
Id. at 773. The posture of the case suggested that the law might have been ginned
up by the regulated entities in order to stave off competition from upstart pharmacies and,
therefore, that Virginia’s stated rationale for the advertising restriction was pretextual. See
Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amendment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV.
579, 591 (2004) (noting that “an implicit distrust of the state’s actual purpose” is one of the
themes in the Court’s rejection of paternalistic speech restrictions).
26
Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756.
27
See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 628 (1985) (“[T]he
extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by
the value to consumers of the information such speech provides . . . .”); Cent. Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (“The First Amendment’s
concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising.”).
But cf. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 479 (1997) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“What stood against the claim of social unimportance for commercial speech
was not only the consumer’s interest in receiving information, . . . but the commercial
speaker’s own economic interest in promoting his wares.” (citations omitted)).
28
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563; see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 766 (1993)
(explaining that “First Amendment coverage of commercial speech is designed to safeguard” society’s “interest[ ] in broad access to complete and accurate commercial information”); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (“[T]he extension of First Amendment protection to
commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information. . . .”); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (“A commercial
advertisement is constitutionally protected not so much because it pertains to the seller’s
business as because it furthers the societal interest in the ‘free flow of commercial information.’” (quoting Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764)).
29
For a general discussion, see Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the
Compelled-Commercial-Speech Conundrum, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 205, 216 (2011).
25
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as a requirement to refrain from speaking.30 In both cases, there is a
threat to the liberty interests of the speaker—interests that are best
framed as the “freedom of mind.”31 As much as liberal tenets of
self-determination depend on the freedom to speak one’s mind, they
also depend on the freedom to be silent.32 This choice of speech resides in the individual conscience.
All this changes for commercial speech because, here, the theory
of First Amendment protection is not freedom of mind but freedom
of information flow. The law of commercial speech therefore differentiates between restrictions and mandates.33 Because commercial
speech restrictions interrupt the flow of information to consumers,
they are viewed with greater skepticism than commercial speech mandates, which typically increase information flow.34 Consistent with the
listener-centric rationale for (reduced) commercial speech protection, the Supreme Court held in the 1985 case Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel that commercial speech mandates raise minimal
constitutional concern where the mandates improve information flow
to consumers.35 Thus was born the disparate treatment of commercial speech restrictions—usually in the form of advertising limits—and
30
See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2332
(2013) (unconstitutional to make federal funding conditional on espousing a belief not
within the scope of the government program); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc.,
487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988) (unconstitutional to require professional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors percentage of donations directed to charities); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (unconstitutional to require expressive license plates);
Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (unconstitutional to require
“right of reply” to newspaper editorials); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943) (unconstitutional to require school children to recite the Pledge of Allegiance).
31
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (“The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking
are complementary components of the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”
(quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637)).
32
See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234–35 (1977) (“[I]n a free society
one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the
State.”).
33
See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651–52 n.14 (discussing disclosure requirements as applied to attorney advertisements and noting that “the
First Amendment interests implicated by [commercial] disclosure requirements are substantially weaker than those at stake when speech is actually suppressed”); id. at 650 (citing
“material differences between disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on
speech”).
34
See id. at 646 (placing the burden on would-be regulators to distinguish between
true and false commercial speech based on the value of the free flow of commercial
information).
35
471 U.S. 626 (1985). Zauderer has also been applied in several other cases. See
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010) (requiring law
firm to identify itself as a “debt relief agency” under Zauderer); Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t
of Transp., 687 F.3d 403, 412–15 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (upholding requirement that airline
advertisements list most prominently the final price, including taxes); N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n
v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 131–34 (2d Cir. 2009) (applying Zauderer analysis to a
regulation requiring posting of calorie counts in restaurants).
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commercial speech mandates—usually in the form of disclosure
requirements.
Zauderer concerned an Ohio requirement that attorneys advertising contingency fee services must disclose that clients were responsible for court costs, even when they had contracted for “no-fee”
services.36 The Court described the disclosure requirement as “purely
factual and uncontroversial.”37 Since protection of commercial
speech is “justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides,” and these disclosures were valuable,
the Court eschewed the Central Hudson intermediate standard of review appropriate for speech restrictions.38 Rather, it held that disclosure requirements that were not “unjustified or unduly burdensome”
would be upheld under a rational basis review if “reasonably related to
the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”39
If Zauderer was a carve-out from Central Hudson, it was also a departure from the other line of cases that might have applied: the compelled noncommercial speech cases. The Court distinguished
commercial from noncommercial speech mandates.40 It noted that in
the classic compelled-speech cases, it applied strict scrutiny to rules
that forced speakers to adopt state-mandated orthodoxies on “matters
of opinion.”41 By contrast, Ohio’s commercial speech mandate did
not assault the regulated attorney’s conscience and trenched very little on his First Amendment interests.42 Indeed, the attorney’s interest
“in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising
[was] minimal.”43
Zauderer has led to considerable confusion in the lower courts
about what sorts of commercial speech disclosure requirements are
covered by its rational basis standard of review.44 Some have held that
it applies only when the government is attempting to prevent con36

See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 633.
Id. at 651.
38
Id. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980), the Court established a four-part test for the constitutionality of commercial
speech: (1) the speech must concern a lawful activity and not be misleading, (2) the asserted government interest relating to that speech must be substantial, (3) the regulation
must directly advance the governmental interest, and (4) it must be no more extensive
than necessary.
39
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
40
See id. (explaining that the interests at stake in commercial speech cases are different from noncommercial speech cases).
41
Id. (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
42
See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (explaining that commercial disclosure requirements
trench more narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than prohibitions).
43
Id. at 651 (emphasis omitted).
44
For an excellent review, see Jacobs, supra note 9, at 863–66.
37
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sumer deception.45 Others have held that it may apply also when the
government has broader informational goals.46 Courts have split on
what kind of consumer deception counts and whether the term
should have a narrow, technical meaning.47 They also disagree on
what the alternative to Zauderer review is: intermediate or strict scrutiny.48 Commentary on the use of Zauderer in the cigarette-labeling
cases has been similarly torn.49
One of the problems is that Zauderer itself was not well reasoned.
The Court starts from the premise that it is carving out for more lenient treatment a state intervention that would otherwise have been subject to searching scrutiny.50 But the law did not then, and does not
now, support this premise. The regulation at issue in Zauderer was a
corrective advertising requirement to fix a deceptive or misleading
commercial ad. An ad that is false, deceptive, or misleading receives
no First Amendment protection at all under Virginia Pharmacy.51 Central Hudson went on to say that commercial speech must at least “not
be misleading” to qualify for constitutional protection.52 Ordinarily,
45
See, e.g., Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) (dairy
industry likely to prevail on merits in challenge to state law requiring disclosure of bovine
growth hormone in dairy products in absence of consumer deception).
46
See, e.g., Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding state law requiring disclosure of mercury content in product labels even though state
interest was in protecting health and the environment, not preventing deception); cf. Int’l
Dairy, 92 F.3d at 74 (Leval, J., dissenting) (arguing disclosure of “information consumers
reasonably desire” even if not necessary to dispel deception is constitutional under
Zauderer).
47
Compare Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 562 (6th
Cir. 2012) (Zauderer deception includes tobacco industry’s “decades-long deception” of the
public about the health risks of smoking and need not be deception on the face of a
product label or advertising), with R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205,
1215–16 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (absence of any specifically misleading statements or omissions
on cigarette labels and advertising means that Zauderer review is inappropriate).
48
Compare R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 272 (D.D.C. 2012)
(default standard of review for compelled commercial speech is strict scrutiny), with R.J.
Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1212 (default standard of review for compelled commercial speech is
intermediate scrutiny).
49
Compare Recent Case, D.C. Circuit Holds that FDA Rule Mandating Graphic Warning
Images on Cigarette Packaging and Advertisements Violates First Amendment: R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 126 HARV. L. REV. 818, 823 (2013) (“On its own terms, Zauderer need not
be limited to these two descriptors [“misleading” and “deceptive”]—Zauderer also referred
to ‘manipulative’ and ‘confus[ing]” as defective qualities that would place commercial
speech under its reach.” (second alteration in original)), with Hardesty, supra note 1, at
2846 (arguing for strict scrutiny review outside the context of deceptive commercial
speech).
50
See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650–51 (1985) (treating the Ohio regulation as a commercial disclosure requirement, which receives less scrutiny than noncommercial compelled speech).
51
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771–72 (1976).
52
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (2010);
see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638 (“[T]he Federal Government [is] free to prevent the dis-
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corrective advertising or affirmative disclosures that prevent or correct
deception simply do not raise First Amendment concerns.53
The mistaken reasoning of Zauderer has created a paradox for
First Amendment review of compelled commercial speech. Although
Zauderer was not needed to hold that corrective advertising merited
rational basis review, the very existence of Zauderer has led some lower
courts to limit rational basis review to corrective advertising.54 More
recent Supreme Court precedent has seemed to support this view,
without squarely endorsing it.55
C. The Constitutional Value of Consumer Autonomy
The justification for more deferential review of commercial
speech mandates is located in notions of consumer autonomy and related informed consent principles.56 Consumer autonomy blossoms
under conditions of sufficient information, and sometimes government intervention is needed to foster these conditions. At the same
time, interventions that circulate the wrong kind of information may
undermine consumer autonomy by skewing autonomous choice.
1. Interest in Receiving Information
Commercial speech law has at its core the interests of the listener,
which are principally autonomy interests. This is in contrast to the
rest of free speech jurisprudence, where speaker autonomy rights are
paramount.57 In commercial speech law, the most important composemination of commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading . . . .”); In re R.M.J.,
455 U.S. 191, 200 (1982) (“False, deceptive or misleading advertising remains subject to
restraint . . . .”).
53
See Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Beneficial
Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir. 1976) (discussing a state actor’s discretion when
dealing with deceptive commercial speech).
54
See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 490–91 (1997) (Souter,
J., dissenting); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
55
Compare Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249–53
(2010) (applying Zauderer to uphold federal disclosure requirements for law firm advertisements that are “inherently misleading”), with Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. and Prof’l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 142–43 (1994) (declining to apply Zauderer to state
regulation of attorney advertising that was not misleading); see also Glickman, 521 U.S. at
491 (Souter, J. dissenting) (“Zauderer carries no authority for a mandate unrelated to the
interest in avoiding misleading or incomplete commercial messages.”).
56
See generally Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L.
REV. 1153, 1171–80 (2012) (exploring autonomy justifications for commercial speech
protection).
57
See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972) (“To permit the
continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government
censorship.”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(stating that “the final end of the State” is to make people “free to develop their faculties,”
and liberty is valuable “both as an end and as a means”); see also Martin H. Redish, The

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-3\crn301.txt

524

unknown

Seq: 12

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

25-FEB-14

12:44

[Vol. 99:513

nent of listener autonomy is the right to receive information, potently
cast as a right against paternalistic state restrictions on speech.58
Paternalism is an especially dirty word in First Amendment jurisprudence.59 In case after case, the Supreme Court has invalidated
speech restrictions it has characterized as paternalistic attempts to deprive people of information that may lead them astray.60 As Justice
John Paul Stevens put it in his plurality opinion striking down a state
law banning advertisements of liquor prices, the “First Amendment
directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep
people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own
good.”61 Notably, the antipaternalism thrust of First Amendment law
is far stronger than in the law more generally. Government is permitted, for example, to control all manner of commerce for the sake of
consumer welfare.62 It can ban products or limit their distribution or
tax them to inutility. But it must tread very lightly when controlling
information that is circulated about those products.63
It was antipaternalism that animated Virginia Pharmacy—the font
of commercial speech protection and the first to foreground conValue of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) (emphasizing individual self-realization as the thrust behind the guarantee of free speech).
58
See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985) (emphasizing the free flow of information as a justification for commercial disclosure requirements);
Paul Horwitz, The First Amendment’s Epistemological Problem, 87 WASH. L. REV. 445, 451 (2012)
(describing the antipaternalistic approach to commercial speech regulation).
59
See id. at 451 (describing an antipaternalistic approach that justifies First Amendment values “because we are reluctant to hand over to the state the authority to make such
determinations”); Carpenter, supra note 25, at 588–98 (tracing the antipaternalism impulse through Supreme Court free speech cases); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy,
and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 338 (1991) (deriving the “persuasion
principle” whereby government may not suppress speech because it may persuade people
to do something harmful). But see Daniel Hays Lowenstein, “Too Much Puff”: Persuasion,
Paternalism, and Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1240 (1988) (contending that
the commercial speech cases do not reflect antipaternalism because the restrictions at issue
seek the good of the collective, not the individual).
60
See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 375 (2002) (pharmaceutical advertising); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 565 (2001) (tobacco product
advertising); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999)
(casino advertising); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996) (liquor price advertising); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995) (beer
alcohol-content labeling); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 458 (1978) (attorney soliciting); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 365 (1977) (attorney price
advertising).
61
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503.
62
See Carpenter, supra note 25, at 587 (discussing examples of governmental regulations of commerce).
63
One explanation for the more stringent antipaternalism in speech jurisprudence is
that we should be especially wary of state efforts to control behavior covertly by limiting
information rather than through more direct and accountable regulation. See, e.g., Martin
H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 589, 601–02 (1996).
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sumer autonomy.64 Virginia thought that by depriving consumers of
price information on prescription drugs, consumers would be forced
to select products based on quality, not price. The Court supported
“an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach[, which is to assume] that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are
well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open
the channels of communication rather than to close them.”65 Of
course, there is a chance that people will not perceive their own “best
interests.” Virginia Pharmacy and its kin put the state and the people to
that risk, adopting in essence the perspective of liberal theorist
Thomas Scanlon, who insists that “[t]he harm of coming to have false
beliefs is not one that an autonomous man could allow the state to
protect him against through restrictions on expression.”66
2. Interest in Truthful Information
If the furtherance of consumer autonomy justifies commercial
speech protection, the same goal prescribes the limits to that protection. The first limit, noted in Virginia Pharmacy itself, concerns the
sphere of protection for commercial speech. In bringing commercial
speech into constitutional bounds, the Court was clear that not all
commercial speech belonged there. In particular, the First Amendment does not protect commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or
misleading,67 and the government is free to regulate such communication to ensure “that the stream of commercial information flow[s]
cleanly as well as freely.”68
Because the principal purpose of commercial speech protection
is to safeguard the consumer’s interests in accurate information, it
naturally follows that inaccurate information would fall outside the
zone of protection. Indeed, one might even say that individuals have
a positive liberty interest in being protected from false or misleading
speech. This is a view of autonomy that Richard Fallon, in his taxon64
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976); Strauss, supra note 59, at 334–71 (discussing listener autonomy interest in First
Amendment cases).
65
425 U.S. at 770. Of course Virginia’s concern was not merely that individuals
would make bad choices for themselves, but that individual choices—even individually rational choices—would turn out to be collectively bad. It was concerned about negative
externalities (poor drug quality) imposed both on those who choose cheaper drugs and on
those who do not. This concern for the collective consequences of individual decision
making is evident in many commercial speech regulation cases. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs.,
Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (local regulation banning for-sale signs to combat
collective segregating effects of individual decisions to sell homes).
66
Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 217
(1972).
67
425 U.S. at 771 (“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.”).
68
Id. at 772.
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omy of the concept, has described as “descriptive autonomy.”69 Lies
undermine autonomy and self-realization. To desist from lying is a
perfect duty in Immanuel Kant’s ethics, never to be overridden.70 Sissela Bok elaborates in the Kantian tradition that lying hinders autonomy by giving listeners false belief as to the world around them and
the actual choices available to them.71 Given the effect of lies, the
government enhances consumer autonomy by penalizing (commercial) deception.72
The second autonomy-enhancing limit on commercial speech
protection emerged in post–Virginia Pharmacy cases. The Court endorsed government strategies to put more information into the marketplace, often as an alternative to paternalistic speech restrictions.73
In Central Hudson, the Court struck down a state regulation banning
promotional advertising by an electric utility in order (paternalistically) to reduce consumer energy demands.74 The state’s suppression
of information impermissibly intruded on listener autonomy. However, the Court noted that the government does have some ability,
aside from disseminating its own advertising campaigns, to inject itself
into the information market: for instance, it would have been permissible for the state to require that a private company’s advertisements
69
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 878 (1994)
(“[W]here descriptive autonomy refers to the actual condition of persons . . . . [it] is an
ideal that can be promoted or protected, sometimes through paternalistic legislation . . . .”). I am simplifying Fallon’s taxonomy, which actually breaks descriptive autonomy (and its obverse—ascriptive or formal autonomy) into positive and negative
libertarian varieties.
70
See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 29–33 (Mary
Gregor ed., rev. ed. 2012) (1785).
71
SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 17–20 (Random
House 1989) (1978).
72
Even if inaccurate information is without value and is particularly baleful in commercial contexts, we might still be concerned that regulating it could chill the production
of truthful information. That is certainly the case in the noncommercial speech context.
The Court has avoided detailed consideration of this issue by asserting that commercial
speakers have greater incentives and wherewithal to avoid the chill and bravely soldier on
in the production of information. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 762 (1985) (“[A]dvertising . . . is hardy and unlikely to be deterred by incidental
state regulation.”); Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24 (“Since advertising is the sine qua non
of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and
forgone entirely.”). For criticism, see Redish, supra note 57, at 633.
73
See, e.g., Meese v. Keen, 481 U.S. 465, 481–85 (1987) (holding required “propaganda” disclosures to be permissible and autonomy enhancing); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 109 (1980) (positing attorney disclosure
mandates as an alternative to advertising restrictions); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (suggesting that the town could engage in its own counter-advertising campaign, including posting lawn signs to combat white flight); Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 365 (1977) (noting that restrictions on attorney advertising alternative
to advertising served to restrict consumers’ access to information).
74
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 569–71
(1980).
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“include information about the relative efficiency and expense of the
offered service.”75 Even Justice Stevens—one of the earliest and most
stalwart exponents of the antipaternalism principle in commercial
speech cases—conceded in his concurrence in Rubin v. Coors Brewing
that “regulations of statements . . . that increase consumer awareness
would be entirely proper.”76
Surprisingly, even in the area of noncommercial speech, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal law that required certain films to be labeled “government propaganda” in Meese v. Keene.77
The Court found that the law, “[b]y compelling some disclosure of
information[,] . . . recognizes that the best remedy for misleading or
inaccurate speech contained within materials subject to the [law] is
fair, truthful, and accurate speech.”78 In fact, exploiting the power of
antipaternalism, the Court said that it was the trial court’s injunction
of the propaganda label that was paternalistic because it would deprive the public of useful information.79 To the Court, the injunction
was like a state statute that prohibited advertising on the assumption
that citizens benefitted from “being kept in ignorance.”80
The perspective on autonomy reflected in Virginia Pharmacy, Central Hudson, and Meese is that state interventions in commercial speech
markets to provide truthful information are not paternalistic but interventions to deprive listeners of truthful information are. This is
consistent with the definition of paternalism as coercive and liberty
depriving.81 State restrictions on truthful information, like private
communication of falsities, are coercive because they deprive the listener of the ability to make informed decisions. The compelled circulation of truthful information, however, is not coercive and can
enlarge opportunities for the exercise of informed self-determination.
Sunstein and Thaler’s recent articulation of “libertarian paternalism”

75

Id. at 571.
514 U.S. 476, 498 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis omitted)
(striking down prohibition on beer label’s display of alcohol content).
77
481 U.S. 465 (1987).
78
Id. at 481.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 482 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769–70 (1976)).
81
See Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 107, 108 (Richard A.
Wasserstrom ed., 1971) (defining paternalism as “the interference with a person’s liberty
of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs,
interests[,] or values of the person being coerced”). As Dale Carpenter points out, most of
the First Amendment cases concern regulations that are justified not by the welfare of the
regulated party but by the welfare of the consumer or public. He notes that this is what
Joel Feinberg calls “two-party” paternalism and Dworkin calls “impure” paternalism. Carpenter, supra note 25, at 615–16.
76
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or “new paternalism” is built on this distinction.82 They start with the
idea that consumer choice is necessarily structured by someone and
there is no purely neutral choice architecture.83 When choice is structured well, it enhances both liberty and welfare by promoting better
analysis and choices that increase social and individual welfare.84
There is yet another view of government interventions in speech
markets—whether they be restrictions on false commercial speech or
mandates to supply information—that places them very much in conflict with the libertarian strain of antipaternalism. The strongest antipaternalist approach to commercial information would be to keep the
government out of information markets entirely.85 This is what Richard Fallon calls an “ascriptive” or formal approach to autonomy.86 He
distinguishes this from the “descriptive autonomy” approach, which
considers individuals to be more or less autonomous depending on
what information and choices they have.87 According to a libertarian
version of formal autonomy theory, the law should treat individuals as

82
SUNSTEIN & THALER, supra note 9, at 74, 248–49 (building on a theory of asymmetric paternalism) (citing Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2003)); Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1159, 1159–60 (2003) (discussing and supporting “libertarian paternalism” as a means of
“steer[ing] people’s choices in welfare-promoting directions without eliminating freedom
of choice”); see also Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of New
Paternalism, 2009 BYU L. REV. 905, 908 (“The new paternalism . . . takes the individual’s
own subjective preferences as the basis for policy recommendations. New paternalist policies allegedly help the individual to better achieve his own subjective well-being, which
cognitive impediments prevent him from attaining on his own.”).
83
Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 82, at 1182 (“[T]here is no way to avoid effects on
behavior and choices. The task for the committed libertarian is, in the midst of such effects, to preserve freedom of choice.”).
84
Id. at 1162 (“[I]n some cases individuals make inferior decisions in terms of their
own welfare—decisions that they would change if they had complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no lack of self-control.”); id. at 1166 (“[P]rograms should be
designed using a type of welfare analysis . . . to measure the costs and benefits of outcomes . . . . [S]ome results from the psychology of decisionmaking should be used to
provide ex ante guidelines to support reasonable judgments about when consumers and
workers will gain most by increasing options.”).
85
See, e.g., Redish, supra note 63, at 625 (“Any time government seeks to control the
content of private communication, free speech concerns are implicated.”); Rodney A.
Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777, 780–83 (1993) (arguing that all commercial speech
should receive the full protection of the First Amendment from government interference).
86
Fallon, supra note 69, at 878 (“[A]scriptive autonomy marks a moral right to personal sovereignty . . . that is incompatible with much if not all paternalism.”). Fallon actually outlines both negative and positive libertarian versions of the ascriptive approach, and
the positive version would presumably approve certain government interventions.
87
Id. (“[D]escriptive autonomy is an ideal that can be promoted or protected, sometimes through paternalistic legislation . . . .”).

R

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-3\crn301.txt

2014]

unknown

VISUAL GUT PUNCH

Seq: 17

25-FEB-14

12:44

529

rational decision makers, fully capable of choosing what is best for
them based on the information that free markets provide.88
Advertising law as we have it does not endorse this version of autonomy. False advertising laws interfere in commercial speech markets to curate information for consumers. In order to protect
consumers, for example, the Lanham Act imposes liability for false
advertising and the confusing use of trademarks.89 The consumer
imagined by these regulations is incapable of sifting true from false
information in the marketplace, or at least should not be put to the
expense of doing so.90 These laws imagine an individual who is supremely capable when presented with truthful information but inept
and vulnerable when presented with false or misleading information.91 Commercial speech doctrine too rejects this formal view of
autonomy, which is one reason the doctrine is under pressure.92
There is a persistent tension between formal and descriptive views
of autonomy that very much inflect consideration of mandatory labels,
88
Embedded in the antipaternalistic response to interventions in commercial speech
markets is a conception of the market supply of information as neutral. Justice Clarence
Thomas, who supports the elimination of any distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, recounted the Court’s decisions that “stress the importance of free
dissemination of information about commercial choices in a market economy” with “free”
meaning what the unregulated market economy produces. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 520 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
89
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (b) (2012).
90
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the
Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 786–87 (2004) (“In economic terms, trademarks contribute
to economic efficiency by reducing consumer search costs. Rather than having to inquire
into the provenance and qualities of every potential purchase, consumers can look to
trademarks as shorthand indicators.”); Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67, 81 (2012) (“According to the search costs theory,
conflicting uses of a trademark undermine the informational quality of the mark, ultimately making it impossible for consumers to rely on the mark as an indicator of the
source and qualities of the goods or services with which the mark is used.”).
91
For a nuanced discussion of this conflict in the context of product warnings, see
Laura A. Heymann, Reading the Product: Warnings, Disclaimers, and Literary Theory, 22 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 393, 395–96 (2010).
92
Justice Thomas has been the leading advocate for abandoning any First Amendment distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S.
at 522 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I do not see a
philosophical or historical basis for asserting that ‘commercial’ speech is of ‘lower value’
than ‘noncommercial’ speech.”). Thomas reiterated this position in later cases and indicated he would not be adverse to overruling Zauderer, saying he was “skeptical of the premise on which Zauderer rests.” Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S.
229, 255 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Some
scholars see the Court as gradually inching towards Justice Thomas’s position, noting that
“[t]he Court came tantalizingly close to embracing Thomas’s view in 44 Liquormart” and
that the Court’s decision in Edenfield v. Fane constituted “a significant step toward Justice
Thomas’s desire to elevate the scrutiny of commercial speech restrictions.” Allen Rostron,
Pragmatism, Paternalism, and the Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 37 VT. L. REV.
527, 545, 547 (2013).
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like the cigarette warnings. The insurgent preference for formal autonomy explains the final listener interest discussed below, while the
dominance of descriptive autonomy in the law explains the failure to
vindicate this interest.
3. Interest in Not Being Spoken To
An informal survey of my law students revealed that many were
uncomfortable with graphic cigarette warning labels because they experienced the communication as government haranguing. This revulsion against state preaching, though possibly widespread, finds little
expression in First Amendment jurisprudence. Notwithstanding the
aspirations of liberal theory to state neutrality,93 the state is relatively
unconstrained in its ability to say what it wants to the public.94
With respect to private speech as well as government speech, First
Amendment law reflects a belief in the power of people to shrug off
what they do not want to hear or see. The First Amendment does not
allow the state to restrict the content of private speech in order to
protect sensitive members of the public from exposure to intrusive or
unwelcome messages.95 In most cases, especially where visual communication is at issue, audience members are expected to avert their
eyes.96 Restrictions have been upheld for the sake of listener interests
only in very limited contexts, such as when radio broadcasts invade
the home.97
The unsettled question here is whether, and to what extent, the
First Amendment bars the state, by means of mandatory disclosure
93
See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 121–22
(Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978) (outlining the political positions of liberals, including a general opposition to unnecessary government intervention).
94
See generally MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983) (arguing that the increasing governmental participation in communication processes threatens First Amendment protections); Gia B. Lee,
Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983 (2005) (discussing the
government’s active participation in communication and arguing that such participation
should be transparent); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980)
(attempting to reconcile the constitutional problems that arise when the government promotes particular values as a speaker rather than a censor); see also Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2000) (contending that the government inevitably will
and should express visions of the good).
95
There are limited exceptions, mainly involving cases of the “captive audience.”
Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. Rev.
939, 943 (2009).
96
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (holding that funeral picketers were
shielded from liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress and intrusion upon
seclusion); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (holding that passerbys
can avert their eyes from nudity on drive-in theater screens); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971) (striking down state restriction on the display of a “Fuck the Draft” jacket in
public because the viewer can turn away).
97
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC’s ban on indecent
speech broadcast during hours when children are likely to be in the audience).
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requirements, from forcing private entities to deliver its messages.
Some scholars have advocated a First Amendment doctrine, rooted in
listener autonomy interests, to protect individuals from governmentmandated speech.98 In large part, these scholars focus on state requirements that women view fetal sonograms before terminating their
pregnancies.99 Caroline Mala Corbin, arguing for a “right against
compelled listening,” writes that “when the government makes a captive audience listen against its will to a government message, it runs
roughshod over individuals’ right to control their own development
and decision-making processes.”100 Her argument is predicated on
the captivity of the listener who is unable to avoid the government’s
message without forsaking a constitutionally protected right of access
to abortion.101 In this sense, it has limited applicability to the commercial product disclosure context. Listener autonomy is only one of
several constitutional interests at stake for women seeking abortions.
They are a special sort of listener, with much more liberty on the line
than those in the typical product disclosure context by dint of the
nature of their decision and the degree of their captivity.102
That said, there probably is a point at which state-mandated
truthful and nonmisleading commercial speech will impair listener interests. Part III locates this point on a spectrum of the “controversialness” of the disclosure, which also serves to distinguish many product
disclosures from abortion-related disclosures. Part II introduces these
issues using graphic cigarette labels as a prime example.
II
NEW GRAPHIC CIGARETTE LABELS
Cigarette labeling is both old hat and innovative, and it has raised
in a pointed way the conflicting values that surround mandatory prod98
See Corbin, supra note 95, at 940–42 (endorsing an audience’s right against compelled listening and supporting restrictions on both private speech and state speech).
99
See id. at 1000–10 (discussing the right against compelled listening in the context of
mandatory abortion counseling); Jacobs, supra note 9, at 885–94 (using abortion disclosure
cases as a framework for analyzing government speech).
100
Corbin, supra note 95, at 980; see also id. at 989–90 (comparing state-compelled
listening in the form of pamphlets for antismoking campaigns with a hypothetical
anti-gay-marriage campaign).
101
See id. at 1000–01 (noting the two forms of mandatory abortion counseling); see also
Jacobs, supra note 9, at 885–94 (discussing the abortion disclosure cases that provide the
framework for an analysis of government-compelled listening). Another important distinction is that the fetal sonogram mandates burden physicians, who are not commercial
speakers.
102
One could imagine a persistent cigarette warning that did capture its audience.
Consider a digital chip embedded in the cigarette box that warned smokers every time they
opened the box that “smoking can kill you.” Of course, smokers could theoretically empty
the box and keep the cigarettes in a case. This degree of captivity would be significantly
greater than that exerted by an image from which smokers can avert their eyes.

R

R
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uct disclosures. The federal government has required warning labels
on cigarette packaging since 1965 without challenge.103 Congress
mandated new labels in 2009104—a mandate that one appellate court
upheld against a constitutional challenge105 and another struck
down106 in 2012. The new labels raised a swarm of questions about
how to balance public health goals with communicative freedom and
how to tease apart the uncontroversial warning from the emotional
gut punch that delivered it.107 This Part will lay out the genesis of
graphic cigarette labels and their tangle in the courts. It is here that
questions concerning the content and form of product admonitions
as they relate to free speech interests and consumer autonomy came
to the fore.
I start with the caveat that the policy choice to amplify tobacco
warnings was ill-advised if smokers in fact do not need more information and will not be influenced by it. Congress’s epistemic assumption
was that consumers (especially children) do not “know” the risks of
smoking.108 The same was true in 1981, when the Federal Trade
Commission reported to Congress that then-current warning labels
had little effect on public awareness and attitudes toward smoking and
that “a new informational remedy may now be necessary.”109 In 1984,
Congress responded by replacing the old labels with the four new

103
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 2, 79 Stat. 282 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012)). Indeed, it was the tobacco industry itself that was instrumental in getting the first warning labels passed as an alternative to more restrictive
regulations on the sale of tobacco products. See Kristin Faucette, First Amendment Challenges
to the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act: Balancing Congress’ Interest in Preserving Public Health with the Tobacco Industry’s Right to Freely Communicate with Adult Smokers, 6 J.
HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 301, 305–06 (2010) (noting that “opponents of smoking viewed the
[1965 labeling requirement] as a victory for cigarette manufacturers because the warning
was weaker than critics of tobacco requested” and maintained the “recurrent omission of
tobacco products from new laws the legislature passed that regulated hazardous or toxic
substances”).
104
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat.
1776 (2009).
105
See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012).
106
See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
107
See id. at 1211–13 (discussing whether FDA smoking warnings go too far, becoming
admonitions instead of warnings); Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 524–27 (addressing the constitutionality of new antismoking labels).
108
See Final Rule, supra note 1, at 36,632–33 (finding that smokers, especially poorly
educated and low-income smokers, grossly underestimate both the statistical risk and personal risk of smoking, and even when smokers are aware of risks, such awareness may be
too abstract to influence them at moment of purchase, especially for new smokers).
109
MATTHEW L. MYERS ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF REPORT ON THE CIGARETTE
ADVERTISING INVESTIGATION 20 (1981), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/eiv
99d00/pdf (finding that the old labels were “overexposed and . . . worn out,” lacked novelty, were too abstract, and lacked personal relevance).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-3\crn301.txt

2014]

unknown

VISUAL GUT PUNCH

Seq: 21

25-FEB-14

12:44

533

ones still found on U.S. cigarette packages today.110 Over twenty years
later, Congress mandated new graphic labels for the same reason: the
old labels were stale and uninformative.111 My goal is not to prove
that consumers need additional information or that labels—whatever
their form—can provide it effectively. I am not recommending information policy but instead examining the free speech implications of a
policy choice.
A. Global Consensus on Health Warnings
In 2005, the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (Framework Convention) went into effect,
embracing a new approach to warning consumers of smoking
hazards.112 Warnings should be large and graphic, the Framework
Convention declared.113 They should occupy most of the cigarette
package in order to impress especially upon potential smokers the
health problems associated with smoking.114 The United States
signed but did not ratify the convention.115 To date, 177 countries
have ratified or acceded to the Framework Convention,116 and at least
sixty have mandated graphic warnings on cigarette packages.117 Most
countries require that the warning labels cover at least half of the
package. Some require “plain packaging” in addition to the graphic
labels, meaning that the manufacturer is prohibited from using color
and other elements of its trade dress on the packages.118
110
Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984).
The amendments made in 1985 to cigarette warning labels are still in effect. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1333 (2012).
111
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat.
1776, 1777 (2009) (outlining the findings to support graphic antismoking labels).
112
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL
(2003), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2003/9241591013.pdf.
113
Id. at 9–10.
114
Id.
115
Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/fctc/signatories_parties/en/ (last updated Sept. 27, 2013) (listing
countries who have either signed and ratified or only signed the Framework Convention).
116
Id. (Tajikistan is the newest party to the Framework Convention).
117
World Health Organization, Article 11: Demand Reduction Measures, FCTC IMPLEMENTATION DATABASE, http://apps.who.int/fctc/reporting/database/ (last visited Jan. 18,
2014). The American and Western Pacific regions have the most picture-based health
warnings. CANADIAN CANCER SOCIETY, CIGARETTE PACKAGE HEALTH WARNINGS: INTERNATIONAL STATUS REPORT 3 (2010), available at http://www.tobaccolabels.ca/healthwarnings
info/statusreport/.
118
These plain packaging requirements have kicked up litigation worldwide. Canada
upheld its law against several claims, including a free speech claim. See Canada (Attorney
General) v. JTI-MacDonald Corp., [2007] S.C.R. 610 (Can.). Litigation in Australia and
other jurisdictions has involved industry claims that the labeling requirements infringe
upon cigarette producers’ trademark rights to identify their products. See, e.g., JT Int’l SA v.
Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43 (Austl.) (Australia’s High Court upholding its tobacco labeling law). Trademark-related actions have been lodged at the World Trade Organization,
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B. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
In 2009, Congress enacted the Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act (the Act),119 the most significant overhaul of cigarette regulations since the federal government first started regulating
cigarettes. The Act’s stated purpose was twofold: to improve consumer information and to modify consumer behavior.120 It required
regulation to “ensure that consumers are better informed” and to
“promote cessation to reduce disease risk and the social costs associated with tobacco-related diseases.”121
Warning labels figured centrally in the achievement of these
goals. The Act required the FDA to create nine color graphic warning
labels emphasizing the causal links between tobacco and disease.122
Consistent with the Framework Convention, the Act specified that the
labels must occupy the top half of the front and rear panels of cigarette packages and also specified that there should be textual warnings taking up at least sixty percent of the total warning area.123 The
Act also prescribed the warning language to be used in conjunction
with the images, including “WARNING: Smoking can kill you” and
“WARNING: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in
nonsmokers.”124
After voluminous notice and comment, the FDA issued its final
rules in June 2011, presenting nine color graphic images to be used
on cigarette packages and advertisements.125 A sampling is below:

claiming that labeling laws (plain packaging in addition to graphic warning) constitute a
trade barrier to tobacco products. For an overview, see Ari Afilalo, Failed Boundaries: The
Near-Perfect Correlation Between State-to-State WTO Claims and Private Party Investment Rights
34–39 (Jean Monnet Working Paper Series 2013), available at http://centers.law.nyu.edu/
jeanmonnet/papers/13/documents/JMWP01Afilalo.pdf. Despite the controversy, nations
continue to roll out plain packaging and graphic warning requirements. See, e.g., Ireland to
Introduce Plain Cigarette Packets, THE GUARDIAN (May 28, 2013, 1:34 PM), http://www.guard
ian.co.uk/world/2013/may/28/ireland-plain-cigarette-packets (discussing Ireland’s new
reforms on cigarette warning labels).
119
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat.
1776 (2009).
120
Id. at 1782.
121
Id. Cessation is a primary objective: “Because the only known safe alternative to
smoking is cessation, interventions should target all smokers to help them quit completely.” Id. at 1779.
122
Id. at 1845 (requiring cigarette manufacturers to visually “depict[ ] the negative
health consequences of smoking”).
123
Id. at 1843. The graphic warnings were also required on printed advertisements.
Id.
124
Id. at 1842.
125
See Final Rule, supra note 1.
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In selecting these images, the FDA considered the graphic warnings adopted by other nations, the scientific literature, and its own
consumer research testing the effectiveness of the images.126 The
measure of effectiveness was explicitly normative. The FDA focused
on the “salience” of the warning in provoking cognitive and emotional
response because research suggests that the more salient the communication, the more likely it is to promote behavior change.127 The
agency concluded that the selected images proved most effective in
“increas[ing] intentions to quit through evoked emotional responses.”128 By “eliciting strong emotional and cognitive reactions[,]
[the] graphic warnings enhance[d] recall and information processing, which help[ed] to ensure that the warning [was] better
processed, understood, and remembered.”129
C. Cigarette Label Litigation: The Circuit Split on the Impact of
Graphic Disclosure
Tobacco companies challenged the mandated warning labels as
unconstitutional content-based speech restrictions that turned commercial speakers into governmental mouthpieces, expressing the government’s disapproval of tobacco products through “subjective and
highly controversial message[s].”130
The first lawsuit was a facial challenge in the Sixth Circuit to the
Act’s graphic warning requirement. In Discount Tobacco City & Lottery,
Inc. v. United States,131 a split panel concluded that the requirement
merited Zauderer rational basis review because the textual warnings,
whatever the accompanying images the FDA ultimately chose, were
“factual” and “accurate.”132 Even if the graphics were emotionally
126

Id. at 36,634–37.
Id. at 36,635, 36,637–39.
128
Id. at 36,639 (citation omitted).
129
Id. at 36,641.
130
Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 524–25 (6th Cir.
2012) (alteration in original).
131
674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012).
132
Id. at 525–27 (finding that the warning labels were neither sufficiently “subjective”
nor “highly controversial” to constitute a content-based restriction on speech and distinguishing them from affirmative limitations on speech that had elicited strict scrutiny review
in other cases).
127
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provocative and included nonliteral elements, their message was
“purely factual and uncontroversial.”133
In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, the D.C. Circuit faced an
as-applied challenge to the adopted labels.134 In another split decision, the majority applied the Central Hudson standard to strike down
the labels.135 It ruled that Zauderer did not apply because the labeling
requirement advanced governmental interests other than preventing
consumer deception.136 Most striking was the court’s perspective on
the role emotions play in free speech analysis. In its view, the mere
fact that the images were “unabashed attempts to evoke emotion”137
made them ineligible for deferential review.138 They could not be
considered purely factual and uncontroversial because “they are primarily intended to evoke an emotional response, or, at most, shock
the viewer into retaining the information in the text warning.”139
Once the problem was framed in this way as nonneutral speech,
the government was handicapped by its public health agenda. The
court in R.J. Reynolds heavily cited FDA statements that the goal of the
warnings was to reduce tobacco use.140 Because of this explicitly normative motivation, the court thought that the government should be
judged on how effective the labels were at actually reducing tobacco
use.141 In other words, once the standard of review shifted from
Zauderer to Central Hudson, the question shifted from achievement of
informational goals to achievement of normative goals. The court
concluded that the “FDA ha[d] not provided a shred of evidence” that
the warnings would “directly cause[ ] a material decrease in smok-

133
Id. at 559 n.8. The court noted that facts, including those presented graphically,
“can disconcert, displease, provoke an emotional response, spark controversy, and even
overwhelm reason, but that does not magically turn such facts into opinions.” Id. at 569.
134
696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
135
Id. at 1217–21. In a dissent, Judge Rogers argued that the majority erred in failing
to apply Zauderer. She thought that “the government need show only that the targeted
commercial speech presents the ‘possibility of deception’ or a ‘tendency to mislead.’” Id.
at 1227 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States,
559 U.S. 229 (2010)). She found that “factually accurate, emotive, and persuasive are not
mutually exclusive descriptions” and that emotional salience is a legitimate indicator of
how effectively the warnings conveyed facts. Id. at 1230–31 (“[T]he emotive quality of the
selected images does not necessarily undermine the warnings’ factual accuracy.” (footnotes
omitted)).
136
696 F.3d at 1213–14 (Zauderer framework appropriate only if the government can
show that, “absent a warning, there is a self-evident—or at least ‘potentially real’—danger
that an advertisement will mislead consumers.” (citation omitted)).
137
Id. at 1217.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 1216.
140
Id. at 1209–11.
141
Id. at 1212–13, 1217–22.
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ing.”142 The court vacated the FDA rule and remanded it back to the
agency.143 The government did not appeal the adverse ruling, leaving
the FDA to rework its labels.144
The approach of R.J. Reynolds to the power of speech is deeply
ironic. The more powerful and influential the mandated warnings
are, the better their chance of modifying smoker behavior and, therefore, the more likely they are to survive a constitutional challenge.
The more forgettable and meaningless the labels, the less likely they
will influence smokers and the more vulnerable they are to constitutional challenge. In Australia, where graphic cigarette warnings are
required, smokers complain that cigarettes have begun to taste
worse.145 We might think that, assuming no change in the product
composition, the warning labels have reduced consumer autonomy by
making smokers believe something that is not true.146 The R.J. Reynolds reasoning runs precisely the other way and would approve the
state’s methods so long as smokers act on the imagined sensory experience to reduce tobacco use.147
One might explain this odd result by pointing to the burden on
the speaker: if labels justified in part by normative goals are not effective in changing behavior, then they burden the speaker for nothing.
142
Id. at 1219. The government’s interest in smoking cessation disqualified it for
Zauderer review. The government’s failure to advance that interest then lost the case under
Central Hudson. It is hard to imagine the original textual warnings surviving Central Hudson
scrutiny either, since it was their ineffectiveness in achieving smoking cessation that led the
government to amplify the warnings with graphics. See id. at 1217–22.
143
Id. at 1221–22; see also Court Denies FDA’s Request for Rehearing of Graphic Label Decision, NATO (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.natocentral.org/?p=2063 (stating that the FDA
must decide whether to file for a Writ of Certiorari in light of five major tobacco companies requesting review of other decisions upholding “the constitutionality of the FDA’s
graphic cigarette health warnings”).
144
No doubt concerned about a sweeping adverse ruling that would jeopardize other
regulatory programs, the U.S. government decided not to appeal its loss in the D.C. Circuit. See Ronald Bayer, David Johns & James Colgrove, The FDA and Graphic Cigarette-Pack
Warnings—Thwarted by the Courts, NEW ENG. J. MED. (July 18, 2013), http://www.nejm.org/
doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1306205?af=R&rss=currentIssue& (“Some feared that the Court
would use the opportunity of an appeal . . . to articulate even more exacting standards for
reviewing commercial speech cases, hobbling future public health initiatives.”); cf. Michael
Felberbaum, Graphic Cigarette Warning Labels: Government Abandoning Legal Battle over Labels
(Mar. 19, 2013, 4:54 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/19/graphic-cigarettewarning-labels_n_2910101.html (highlighting the FDA’s decision to develop new cigarette
warning labels to replace those that violated the First Amendment).
145
Matt Siegel, Labels Leave a Bad Taste, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2013, at B1 (quoting Australian health minister explaining that “people being confronted with the ugly packaging
made the psychological leap to disgusting taste”).
146
I will argue that autonomy-reducing manipulation requires some intentionality,
meaning that the images would not actually be manipulative unless they were designed to
inculcate this false belief. See infra Part IV.A and accompanying text.
147
See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1221–25 (“The First Amendment requires the government not only to state a substantial interest justifying a regulation on commercial speech,
but also to show that its regulation directly advances that goal.”).
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Although the regulated commercial entity has limited liberty interests,
they are not zero.148 At some point, when the labels are large enough
and the message disparaging enough, the burden on the speaker becomes “undue.”149 Indeed, given the limited real estate on a product
package, a large disclosure necessarily supplants so much speech that
the speech mandate functions as if it were a (content-neutral) speech
restriction.150 This is probably where the analysis ultimately needs to
go and where the cigarette labels might well fail. The undue burden
analysis, like the content analysis required by the other parts of
Zauderer, implicates positions on proper state goals and the communicative impact of the warnings.151 On these matters, the two circuit
court opinions diverged, revealing dramatically different perspectives
on what it means to inform and the role of emotions in truthful communications. It is to these issues that I now turn in the next two Parts.
III
PRODUCT DISCLOSURES

AND

CONSUMER AUTONOMY

The cigarette labeling controversy surfaces fundamental questions about the communicative impact of mandatory product disclosure. Selecting a First Amendment standard of review is the doctrinal
expression of values that can be stated more generally.152 The law
and theory of mandatory product labeling favor disclosure when it
corrects for important information deficits, thereby supporting consumer autonomy (assuming acceptable burdens on speaker liberty).153 In the absence of such information deficits, disclosure
148
See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (acknowledging that although listeners’ interests principally justify commercial speech protection,
commercial speakers do possess “First Amendment rights” and must be protected from
“unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements [that] might offend the First
Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech”).
149
See id. at 642 (“[P]rint advertising generally . . . poses much less risk of overreaching or undue influence.”).
150
Had the tobacco companies used their packaging to accomplish something other
than trade dress—for example, to advocate for a cause—the speech-supplanting effect of
the labels would have been obvious.
151
See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638, 651 (“Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive
. . . may be restricted only in the service of a substantial governmental interest, and only
through means that directly advance that interest.” (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980))).
152
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980) (explaining the First Amendment standard of review in the context of commercial
speech, which is based on the “informational function of advertising”).
153
Commercial speech law, while not placing a heavy value on speaker liberty, places
some value on it, so even autonomy-enhancing disclosures must not overburden speaker
liberty. This question of the appropriate burden on the speaker circles back to the definition of the information deficit. The more trivial the information deficit, the more unreasonable the burden on the speaker will seem.
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mandates are unjustified and, indeed, may harm autonomy and other
listener interests by manipulating, confusing, or deceiving.
This formulation puts heavy weight on the identification of information deficits. In this Part and the next, I will use the case of cigarette labels to probe the distinct narratives about consumer autonomy
and information deficits that the labels engender. This Part focuses
on appropriate communications goals and the next on appropriate
communications means.
Objections to the labels begin with the claim that there is no
meaningful information deficit either because there was no preexisting deception or because people already know what the labels purport
to say.154 The argument continues that any autonomy gains the labels
might advance are undercut by the imposition of the government’s
normative values about smoking.155 I argue that the risk of tobacco
use is an information deficit not because information has been withheld but because it has not been communicated effectively. The issue
of information deficit concerns not only the supply of information but
also its processing and consumption. I also argue that the existence of
explicitly normative goals, if uncontroversial and not distorting, is
consistent with consumer freedom.
A. Information Deficits Beyond Deception
Mandatory disclosures in commercial speech are premised on the
notion that the market has failed to produce relevant consumer information, and this deficit warrants regulatory intervention. Zauderer was
an easy case involving the commercial speaker’s misleading or deceptive communications about price.156 Lower courts have sparred over
whether deception-correction is the only context in which commercial
disclosure mandates should be subject to lenient review.157 The R.J.
Reynolds court held that it was.158 The court in Discount Tobacco dis154

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1211–12 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
See id. at 1216–17 (explaining that the FDA’s “inflammatory images
and . . . provocatively-named hotline cannot rationally be viewed as pure attempts to convey information to consumers”).
156
See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 631–34.
157
Compare Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he
compelled disclosure at issue here was not intended to prevent ‘consumer confusion or
deception’ per se but rather to better inform consumers about the products they purchase.
Although the overall goal of the statute is plainly to reduce the amount of mercury released into the environment, it is inextricably intertwined with the goal of increasing consumer awareness . . . .” (internal citations omitted)), with Cent. Ill. Light Co. v. Citizen Util.
Bd., 827 F.2d 1169, 1173 (7th Cir. 1987) (“While Zauderer holds that sellers can be forced
to declare information about themselves needed to avoid deception, it does not suggest
that companies can be made into involuntary solicitors for their idealogical [sic]
opponents.”).
158
See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1214 (“Zauderer, Ibanez, and Milavetz thus establish that
a disclosure requirement is only appropriate if the government shows that, absent a warn155
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agreed but went on to find that a history of tobacco industry deception qualified even in the absence of deception on cigarette
packages.159
It is a stretch to find deception on cigarette labels merely because
the industry has engaged in past deception. And it is a stretch that
should be unnecessary. As a doctrinal matter, deceptive commercial
speech never received First Amendment protection, and controls on
deception were not subject to heightened scrutiny.160 If the Zauderer
rule applied only to corrective advertising—that is, only in cases
where, absent the contested disclosure requirement, the plaintiff’s advertisement would be false or misleading—the rule would be entirely
superfluous, since in all such cases the government would prevail anyway under the first prong of the Central Hudson test.161
Moreover, if lenient review were reserved solely for
deception-correction, then many noncontroversial and longstanding
disclosure mandates would be subject to heightened First Amendment
review.162 These include requirements that manufacturers disclose
product origin,163 gas mileage,164 light bulb lumens and energy
cost,165 textile content,166 and hazardous material.167 None of these
was enacted to combat deception. All were meant to supply consumers with information that various constituencies wanted them to have
ing, there is a self-evident—or at least potentially real—danger that an advertisement will
mislead consumers.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
159
See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 530–31 (6th
Cir. 2012); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 560–61 (2001) (reviewing
documentation of the deleterious effects of tobacco advertising); United States v. Philip
Morris USA, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2012) (discussing the public denial and
distortion of the adverse health effects of tobacco).
160
See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
161
The Supreme Court reiterated just three years before Zauderer that “when the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading or
when experience has proved that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the States may
impose appropriate restrictions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely.” In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
162
Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 116.
163
See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 303.33 (2013) (textile fiber products); id. § 301.12 (2013) (imported furs); 7 C.F.R. § 65.300 (2013) (certain foods).
164
16 C.F.R. § 259.2 (2013).
165
Id. § 305.15.
166
Id. § 303.15.
167
Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (2012). Other disclosure requirements include: federal election campaign contribution disclosures, 2 U.S.C. § 434
(2012); securities disclosures, 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2012); reporting pollutants in discharges to
water, 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (2012); reporting releasing of toxic substances, 42 U.S.C. § 11023
(2006); prescription drug advertisement disclosures, 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2013); notification
of workplace hazards, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2013); warning of potential exposure to hazardous substances, “Proposition 65,” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 2013);
and pesticide disclosures, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 33-0707 (McKinney 2013).
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and to move consumption choices in a particular direction.168 In fact,
under the narrow interpretation, Zauderer leniency would not apply to
required disclosure of health or safety (or economic or other) risks
where the plaintiff advertiser had made no health or safety claims of
its own and therefore had made no deceptive ones. Zauderer would
not even apply, for example, to a constitutional challenge against the
Surgeon General’s original cigarette labels—let alone against the
beefed-up, as-yet uncontested, textual parts of the new graphic disclosures. The government would have to defend those disclosure requirements under the Central Hudson test and conceivably even under
strict scrutiny with its required showing of efficacy. This would be no
easy task in view of the fact that it is precisely the inefficacy of textual
warnings that gave rise to the FDA’s felt need for graphics.169
There is another view that Zauderer has substantially broader
scope and that deception-correction is not the only consumer protection interest qualifying for rational basis review.170 Robert Post has
argued that the “extraordinarily lenient [Zauderer] test for the review
of compelled commercial speech” applies whenever a mandatory disclosure serves to “promote transparent and efficient markets.”171 Improving market efficiency could justify any disclosures likely to inform
consumption choices, ranging from price to composition to production methods and beyond. A number of courts have taken this posi-

168
See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Appliance Labeling Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,696,
41,697 (July 19, 2010) (The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-140, sets new energy efficiency standards for light bulbs and, “[i]n conjunction with
these new efficiency standards, EISA directs the FTC to consider the effectiveness of its
current light bulb labeling requirements and possible alternatives to help consumers understand and choose new high efficiency bulbs that meet their needs.” (emphasis added)); Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,478, 39,478,
39,482 (July 6, 2011) (stating that labeling “changes will help consumers to make more
informed vehicle purchase decisions” and may prompt consumers to “place more weight
on fuel economy and vehicle emissions for economic or environmental reasons”).
169
See Final Rule, supra note 1, at 36,629–30 (noting that many public comments
“stated that smokers would be more likely to quit smoking and that nonsmokers would be
less likely to start smoking if cigarette advertisements and packages display[ed], visually
and graphically, the health effects of cigarettes”).
170
See generally Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial
Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U.
L. REV. 555, 562 (2006) (“Sometimes, as in Zauderer, disclosures are compelled in order to
prevent potential deception. But frequently the disclosure of information is required in
order to promote transparent and efficient markets.”).
171
See id. at 560, 562 (citing SEC disclosure rules and credit disclosure rules); id. at 584
(noting that “commercial speech is routinely and pervasively compelled for reasons that
have little to do with the prevention of deception,” including mandatory disclosure of light
bulb durability, gasoline octane ratings, textile care, car gas mileage, chemical toxicity,
etc.).
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tion in upholding product disclosures that inform consumers who
were not in danger of being deceived.172
A trio of Second Circuit cases show the pitfalls of this expansive
definition of information deficits.173 In National Electric Manufacturers
Ass’n v. Sorrell, the Second Circuit held that a governmental interest in
the disclosure of “accurate, factual, commercial information,” even if
not necessary to prevent deception, qualifies for Zauderer review because it “contributes to the efficiency of the marketplace of ideas” and
“does not offend the core First Amendment values of promoting efficient exchange of information or protecting individual liberty interests.”174 Another Second Circuit panel that included now-Justice
Sonia Sotomayor affirmed a decision upholding a calorie disclosure
mandate under rational basis review, where the court below had held
that the mandate supplies “beneficial consumer information” and supplements “incomplete commercial messages.”175 In a third Second
Circuit case, Judge Pierre Leval defined this generous approach to
information deficits even more broadly.176 Dissenting from a decision
that invalidated a state mandate to disclose the use of bovine growth
172
See, e.g., Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 556 (6th
Cir. 2012) (stating that disclosures do not have to directly, significantly, or exclusively prevent consumer deception, only be “reasonably related to preventing consumer deception”); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 310 (1st Cir. 2005) (applying
Zauderer where interest was “ensuring that [Maine’s] citizens receive the best and most
cost-effective health care possible”); id. at 310 n.8 (noting the court has “found no cases
limiting Zauderer” to potentially deceptive advertising); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell,
272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying Zauderer where interest was “protecting human
health and the environment from mercury poisoning”).
173
See generally Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 115 (stating that a reasonable relation to a commercial interest is sufficient for information); N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, No.
08 Civ. 1000(RJH), 2008 WL 1752455, at *9 n.10, *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008), aff’d, 556
F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009) (referencing that any useful consumer information qualifies as
information ); Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1996) (Leval, J.,
dissenting) (stating that consumer interest alone does not qualify information for compelled disclosure).
174
272 F.3d at 114–15 (internal quotation marks omitted) (upholding mercury disclosure rule even though “the compelled disclosure at issue here was not intended to prevent
‘consumer confusion or deception’ per se but rather to better inform consumers about the
products they purchase” (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985))); see also Promulgation of Trade Regulation Rule, 43 Fed. Reg. 59,614, 59,638
(Dec. 21, 1978) (“By establishing a uniform, minimal set of required information, disclosure requirements enhance the efficiency of markets by facilitating comparison of competing franchise offerings.”).
175
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 2008 WL 1752455, at *9 n.10, *10. The phrase “beneficial
consumer information” comes from 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501
(1996) (Stevens, J.) (distinguishing permissible disclosure requirements from impermissible restrictions), and the phrase “incomplete commercial messages” comes from Glickman
v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 491 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing
Zauderer coverage).
176
See Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 74, 80–81 (Leval, J., dissenting) (state law mandating the
“disclosure of information consumers reasonably desire” advances First Amendment interests and should be subject to rational basis review).
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hormones in dairy products, he argued that Zauderer extended to any
information that “consumers reasonably desire.”177
A broad view of information deficits is especially appealing for
advocates of ethical consumption. Douglas Kysar, in his highly original scholarship on the exercise of consumer “preferences for
processes,” argues that the law insufficiently supports consumers who
want to exercise preferences for ethically produced products.178 Consumers desiring environmentally sustainable products, for example,
might value knowing about product lifecycle environmental impact.179 Voluntary certification regimes in fair trade coffee and sustainably harvested wood reflect a growing market for ethical
manufacturing processes, signified on the product label.180
The problem is that the use of mandatory labels to support consumer preferences is not cost free.181 They are expensive for manufacturers, they risk crowding out other messages on scarce labeling
real estate, and they may be confusing for consumers.182 Once we
177

Id. at 74.
Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 623 (2004) (“[P]articularly at a time when
consumption occupies such a strong position of influence over culture and identity, analysts should be hesitant to discount the importance of religious or ethical grounds for
consumer decisionmaking.” (citation omitted)); see also Jeffrey J. Minneti, Relational Integrity Regulation: Nudging Consumers Toward Products Bearing Valid Environmental Marketing
Claims, 40 ENVTL. L. 1327, 1344–45 (2010) (arguing for a system of environmental marketing regulation that harnesses and develops the full range of consumer and manufacturer
interests in sustainable products and processes).
179
Indeed, product lifecycle marketing has given rise to false advertising litigation as
companies jockey for the sustainable consumer. See, e.g., Hill v. Roll Int’l Corp., 128 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 109, 111 (Ct. App. 2011) (alleging that a green drop on a water bottle misleadingly connoted sustainability); Complaint for Injunction, Civil Penalties, and Other Relief,
California v. Enso Plastics, LLC, No. 30-2011, 2011 WL 5103052 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 26,
2011) (alleging the labeling of some plastic containers as biodegradable was false); NAT’L
ADVERTISING DIV. OF THE BETTER BUS. BUREAU, ENVIRONMENTAL DIGEST 2–11 (2012), available at http://www.asrcreviews.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ASRC-EnvironmentalClaims-Digest-9-28-12-pdf.pdf (describing several cases decided by the NAD pertaining to
misleading or deceptive marketing practices involving environmental claims).
180
See Margaret Chon, Marks of Rectitude, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2311, 2312 (2009) (examining how trademarks and certification marks can “facilitate consumer protection and
access to quality market information”).
181
See generally FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 10, at 56 (“[T]he cost of acquiring
and using new information must be low enough to justify users’ efforts in relation to expected benefits.”).
182
See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 10, at 697–702 (describing reasons why
mandatory disclosures fail to achieve their ends); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420,
1455 (1999) (“Regardless whether manufacturers originally caused such consumer misunderstanding of dietary health issues, it is our contention that their packaging, labeling, and
promotional efforts exacerbate it.”); Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the
“Right to Know” from the “Need to Know” About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG.
293, 370 (1994) (“Consumer research conducted by industry and by FDA demonstrated
that simpler, less cluttered label formats help consumers to make comparisons between
178
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have ventured beyond deceptive or misleading speech, there is no natural limit to what Justice Stevens called “beneficial consumer information.”183 In the Second Circuit’s bovine-growth hormone decision,
from which Judge Leval dissented, the majority noted that “[w]ere
consumer interest alone sufficient [to justify disclosure mandates],
there is no end to the information that states could require manufacturers to disclose about their production methods,” including “which
grains herds were fed, with which medicines they were treated, or the
age at which they were slaughtered.”184 That court did not limit disclosure mandates to deception correction.185 But to reduce the likelihood of mandate proliferation, it did require “some indication that
[the mandated] information bears on a reasonable concern for
human health or safety or some other sufficiently substantial governmental concern.”186
This limitation does not really resolve the question of what counts
as a correctable informational deficit. It simply defines the deficit
with reference to a “substantial governmental concern,” which could
relate to health and safety or to ethical considerations such as whether
food contains genetically modified organisms.187
We are left with a continuum of information deficits, ranging
from technical deception and moving through gaps in health and
safety information all the way to any information that interests consumers.188 It is not clear that the consumer-autonomy interest is
strongest at the deception end of the spectrum.189 Take a sneaker
manufacturer. It could actively deceive consumers about the composition of the product while simply remaining silent on the fact that it
was produced by slave labor—something that many consumers might
care more about. It is perhaps because of the difficulty of connecting
a particular class of information deficits to consumer-autonomy interproducts.” (quoting Food Labeling: Mandatory Status of Nutrition Labeling and Nutrient
Content Revision, Format for Nutrition Label, 58 Fed. Reg. 2079, 2122 (Jan. 6, 1993))).
183
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996).
184
Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996).
185
See id. (indicating that health and safety concerns also justify mandated
disclosures).
186
Id.
187
See Amy Harmon & Andrew Pollack, Battle Brewing over Labeling of Genetically Modified Food, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/25/science/dis
pute-over-labeling-of-genetically-modified-food.html?_r=0 (describing California’s failed
2012 Proposition 37, which would have required labeling of genetically engineered materials contained in food products, and mentioning labeling bills recently proposed in over a
dozen states); Mark Bittman, G.M.O.’s: Let’s Label ’Em, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2012, 3:19 PM)
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/15/g-m-o-s-lets-label-em/ (characterizing
such proposals as “right-to-know law[s]”).
188
See Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 74 (favoring mandatory disclosures of health and safety information to the public); id. at 80–81 (Leval, J., dissenting) (favoring mandatory disclsoures
of any information that consumers reasonably desire to be disclosed).
189
See supra notes 67–72 and accompanying text.
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ests that courts have not tried and instead have looked for other binaries as independent grounds to differentiate among rationales for
disclosure. These binaries are, like the antideception approach to information deficits, unsatisfying.
B. The Fact-Value Distinction and Precaution Advocacy
One of the strongest arguments a manufacturer can make against
compelled commercial speech is that the government is using its regulatory powers to privilege a favored value rather than to fill a “purely
factual” information deficit.190 This subpart focuses on the opposition
of facts and values, which entails a distinction between the government’s informational goals to advance truth and its normative ones to
push a substantive agenda—a distinction that is ultimately illusory.
As discussed above, the R.J. Reynolds court subscribed to the narrow, deception-limited reading of information deficits.191 But even if
the court had accepted the broader definition, it would have found
the cigarette labels problematic and required heightened scrutiny because the labels “browbeat consumers into quitting” smoking.192 The
government made no secret that it was interested as much in changing consumer behavior as in informing consumers of risk.193 This
normative goal, particularly given the emotional impact of the message, made every cigarette pack a “mini billboard” for the government’s opinion.194 The labels “compel a product’s manufacturer to
convey the state’s subjective—and perhaps even ideological—view”
that consumers should not smoke.195 In this way, the court suggested
that the government’s public health agenda overshadowed and undermined its autonomy-maximizing informational agenda.196
The invalidation of the cigarette labels raises questions about
whether disclosures, much less warnings, can ever (or usually) be
purely informative. The ideal of purely informative speech is an ideal
of speech neutrality, where facts are shorn of value.197 It is an ideal
190

Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
192
Id. at 1217.
193
Final Rule, supra note 1, at 36,633.
194
R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1212 (quoting FDA, Tobacco Strategy Announcement (Nov.
10, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/%20TobaccoProducts/NewsEvents/ucm
232556.htm).
195
Id.; see also id. at 1211 (“The Companies contend that, to the extent the graphic
warnings go beyond the textual warnings to shame and repulse smokers and denigrate
smoking as an antisocial act, the message is ideological and not informational.”).
196
See id. at 1221.
197
See, e.g., HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND
OTHER ESSAYS 43 (2002) (arguing that facts and values are intertwined); see also RICHARD
RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 364 (1979) (questioning the fact/value
distinction); R. W. SLEEPER, THE NECESSITY OF PRAGMATISM: JOHN DEWEY’S CONCEPTION OF
PRAGMATISM 141 (1986) (same). In other contexts, this insight has been used to debunk
191
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that the philosophical literature on the fact-value distinction treats
skeptically.198 Pragmatist critics, most notably Hilary Putnam, teach
that belief frequently infuses both the composition and the selection
of facts.199 With respect to the composition of facts, there are natural
or empirical facts that exist with little to no judgment involved.200 A
“killing” is one such fact. It exists in nature as the taking of a life. But
many other facts are what we might call “evaluative.”201 They cannot
exist without judgment. Once we define some killings as “murder,”
entailing judgments as to justified homicide or self-defense, we have
created an evaluative fact with value.202 In addition, the choice to
highlight certain facts, whether natural or evaluative, entails judgment
as to salience.
Government labeling schemes will often use normative judgments to construct evaluative facts or to thrust facts into special prominence. Sugar is a natural fact. The choice to include sugar on a
nutritional label is arguably free of normative content. But the choice
to highlight sugar on a front-of-pack label reflects a norm that sugar is
special among ingredients.
Sometimes, the value importation will work at both the fact-definition and the fact-selection levels. The voluntary federal organic certification creates an evaluative fact. What is considered “organic” is
built on judgments about animal husbandry and agricultural
health.203 This evaluative fact is then embedded in a normative system that uses labels to promote the market for organic goods.204 Simthe notion that there is such a thing as a neutral algorithm or unprocessed data. See “RAW
DATA” IS AN OXYMORON (Lisa Gitelman ed., 2013).
198
See supra note 197.
199
See id.
200
William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-Enforcing and
Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 894 (2013).
201
Scholars use the term in different ways. Compare, e.g., id. at 894–96 (distinguishing
“evaluative facts,” which “include an element of ideological precommitment” from “empirical facts,” which are more “subject to conclusive proof or disproof”), with Justin Hughes,
Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43, 68 (2007)
(defining them as judgments about reality that are so widely accepted as to become treated
as fact). I am using the term more in Araiza’s way to describe a fact that is built on a moral
judgment. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 87, 127–28 (1996) (discussing “normative properties or facts”).
202
See Araiza, supra note 200, at 894–95 (distinguishing between “empirical facts” and
“evaluative facts”).
203
See Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, S. REP. NO. 101-357, at
2 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 4657 (“The ultimate purposes of [the organic program] are to ensure consumers an abundance of food and fiber at reasonable
prices, to maintain the competitiveness of American farm products while providing a fair
return to producers, and to conserve the natural resources which serve as the basis for all
agricultural production.”).
204
7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6523 (2012) (facilitating interstate commerce in organically produced fresh and processed food); see Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law and Future of
Environmental Labeling, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 147, 172 (1993) (“[I]t may be impossible to
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ilarly, the decision to require gas mileage performance disclosures on
cars was driven by a conservation agenda.205 Car stickers have recently
been updated to include many other facts as the result of a law aimed
at energy independence.206
The boundaries between facts and value are particularly porous
when the facts are in the form of warning. The philosopher John
Searle has shown that the nature of warning is argumentative.
Searle’s dissertation advisor, J.L. Austin, theorized that utterances can
be analyzed according to their desired impact, or what he called their
“illocutionary acts.”207 Building on this work, Searle created a
five-part classification system for illocutionary acts. One class is the
“directive,” which includes warnings.208 Directives “are attempts . . .
by the speaker to get the hearer to do something.”209 If you say to
someone before they touch a stovetop “That’s hot!,” you mean for the
utterance to inform while at the same time effect a change in behavior. When a tobacco label, whether textual or graphic, tells you that
smoking kills, the message is designed to inform and to direct.
The mandate to inform consumers of tobacco risks reveals the
mingling of fact and value at every turn. Throughout the fifty-year
history of tobacco marketing and reactive regulation, the industry and
government have competed to persuade consumers of the utility and
disutility of smoking, while variously hiding and exposing certain
facts.210 The tobacco industry has been at the leading edge of innova-

prevent deceptive environmental advertising in a meaningful way without concurrently
promoting environmental policy goals.”). But c.f. Press Release, Dan Glickman, Sec’y of
Agric., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Release of Final National Organic Standards (Dec. 20, 2000)
(claiming that the organic designation was “a marketing tool” rather than “a value judgment about nutrition or quality”). See generally Michelle T. Friedland, You Call That Organic? The USDA’s Misleading Food Regulations, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 379 (2005) (providing
an overview of organic program and its substantive pitfalls).
205
See, e.g., Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label, 76 Fed.
Reg. 39,478, 39,481 (July 6, 2011).
206
40 C.F.R. § 600.006 (2013); The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 105, 121 Stat. 1492 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 32908 (2006)). For an
exploration of the “preference-shaping effects” of labeling requirements, see Rebecca
Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of “False” Is: Falsity and Misleadingness in Commercial
Speech Doctrine, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 227, 250 & n.107 (2007).
207
See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 98 (J.O. Urmson ed., 1962).
208
See John R. Searle, A Classification of Illocutionary Acts, 5 LANGUAGE SOC’Y 1, 11
(1976). Searle defined “directives” to include “ask, order, command, request, beg, plead,
pray, entreat, and also invite, permit, and advise” as well as many of Austin’s “exercitives.”
Id. (citations omitted). Austin’s exercitives include warning. See id. at 7.
209
Id. at 11. Directives can be distinguished from representatives that “commit the
speaker . . . to something’s being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition.” Id. at
10.
210
See infra notes 212–16 and accompanying text.
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tive marketing strategies.211 In some cases the advertising was deceptive, but in the main, it was just seductive.212
From its first adoption of mandated warnings, government has
viewed disclosure as a way to counteract tobacco marketing by informing consumers of risk and persuading them to act on this knowledge.213 The government’s labeling strategy merged the facts of
tobacco risk with the value of tobacco-use reduction. It was a form of
what one risk consultant has labeled “precaution advocacy”214—advocating a change in behavior through warning of risk. The normative
strain in the warning strategy became more prominent in 2006 with
the shift in responsibility for administering the warnings from the Federal Trade Commission, with its focus on false advertising, to the Federal Drug Administration, with its focus on health.215
It is hard to see how communicating with value, by itself, undermines consumer autonomy. In First Amendment cases, courts have
scoffed at the notion that consumers are so fragile that they lose independent decision-making ability when faced with compelling narratives.216 False advertising law similarly trusts consumers to withstand
persuasion and exercise choice in the swirl of tendentious speech.217
211

ROBERT N. PROCTOR, GOLDEN HOLOCAUST: ORIGINS OF THE CIGARETTE CATASTROPHE
CASE FOR ABOLITION 58, 59–60 (2011) (“[I]t is probably fair to say that the [tobacco] industry invented much of modern marketing.”); see also Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed.
Reg. 8324, 8341–48 (1964) (codified at 16 C.F.R. ch. 1, subch. D, pt. 408 (2013)) [hereinafter Unfair or Deceptive Advertising] (detailing cigarette advertising campaigns that described “the satisfactions to be derived from smoking” and the “association of smoking with
individuals, groups, or ideas worthy of emulation or likely to be emulated”); ALLAN M.
BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY: THE RISE, FALL, AND DEADLY PERSISTENCE OF THE PRODUCT THAT DEFINED AMERICA 32 (2007) (“[Cigarette companies] anticipated central elements of twentieth-century marketing, not only of the cigarette, but of numerous other
goods in a burgeoning consumer culture. Novelty and innovation became characteristic
elements of cigarette marketing.”).
212
See Unfair or Deceptive Advertising, supra note 211, at 8341–42 (describing various
tobacco advertising slogans).
213
See, e.g., id. at 8357–58 (describing early efforts by the FTC to disclose health
hazards of smoking especially for children and youth).
214
Peter M. Sandman, Precaution Advocacy (High Hazard, Low Outrage), THE PETER
SANDMAN RISK COMMUNICATION WEBSITE, http://www.psandman.com/index-PA.htm (last
visited Jan. 21, 2014).
215
FDA Authority Over Tobacco Products, 21 U.S.C. § 387a (2012).
216
See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
217
15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012) (permitting the FTC to take action against activity only
when it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition”). An act or practice is deceptive only if there is a representation
or omission of information that is likely to materially mislead a reasonable consumer—that
is, to mislead in a way that “affect[s] the consumer’s conduct or decision with regard to a
product or service.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, DECEPTION POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION
(1983), appended to Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 175 (1984); see also id. at 179
(asserting that the FTC will not pursue cases involving obviously exaggerated advertisements); Novartis Corp. v. FTC, 223 F.3d 783, 786 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (following the FTC’s
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This law recognizes that opinion and fact are inextricably bound. Advertisers may be liable for opinion that conveys materially false information or they may be free from liability for facts so laced with
opinion that they convey nothing material at all.218 The communicative content is independent of the designation of fact or value.219
While value may be inextricable from fact, that does not mean
that the kind and strength of value is irrelevant to First Amendment
considerations. Government motive is a central consideration in First
Amendment law.220 What is important is both the nature of the value
and the balance of contestable value with uncontestable fact. To see
this, recall Zauderer, which involved an attorney’s offer to represent
women injured by a faulty medical device.221 In the actual case, the
attorney was disciplined for violating the Ohio Code of Professional
Practice because his advertised fee structure was deceptive.222 Suppose instead that the state had passed a law mandating the same disclosure for a different reason: to reduce the number of women who
would sue for the faulty medical device. What if, alongside the desire
to inform consumers, the state was acting to change their behavior?
Consumers are informed to the same extent and can exercise choice
guidelines that a “deceptive” claim be material and likely to mislead a reasonable consumer). See generally David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395,
1447–48 (2006) (arguing for expanded liability for puffery).
218
Compare McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 F.2d 1544, 1548–49
(2d Cir. 1991) (holding as actionable under the Lanham Act an advertisement that is “either literally false or . . . though literally true, is likely to mislead and confuse consumers”),
with Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 496 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding “a
general claim of superiority over a comparable product that is so vague, it would be understood as a mere expression of opinion” not actionable under the Lanham Act (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
219
The recognition that facts, opinion, and hyperbole often mingle in truthful communications runs through defamation law as well. The Supreme Court has resisted making categorical distinctions among these categories of speech, insisting instead on a
contextual analysis of the communication. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1,
18–20 (1990) (rejecting categorical distinction between opinions and facts in defamation
claims); see also Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that the
“threshold question” in a defamation claim is “whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the contested statement implies an assertion of objective fact” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1233–38 (D.
Or. 2011) (finding some statements of blogger actionable defamation even though they
were hyperbolic, while other more factual statements were not because of context).
220
Several scholars have theorized an influence-checking function of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 425–27 (1996) (First Amendment doctrine
reads as if it had been constructed to “ferret out improper [governmental] motive”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 145 (2010) (a
principal conception of the First Amendment is as “a negative check on government tyranny” over “private ordering”).
221
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1985).
222
Id. at 634–35.
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to the same extent. Does the state’s motive matter? I argue that it
does in the next subpart.
C. State Motive, Controversy, and Ideology
I have suggested that a normative agenda, although unavoidable,
may so destabilize an informative agenda that more searching scrutiny
of mandated disclosures is warranted. When? This is the question at
the heart of the Zauderer progeny’s struggle to distinguish among
consumer informational interests.223 The answer turns on the terms
“uncontroversial” and “purely factual” from Zauderer.224 “Uncontroversial” should be given a distinct meaning, having to do with government motive. We should be skeptical of disclosures that, even if
purely factual, are designed to advance a controversial ideology as opposed to a generally accepted norm.225 The theory here again has to
do with listener interests, although not strictly with autonomy interests. Rather, it is a broader set of interests in a public discourse free of
state compulsion.226
The compelled noncommercial speech cases clearly prohibit the
government from requiring communications in the noncommercial
context.227 Commercial speech is different, Robert Post has persuasively argued, because it does not contribute to “public discourse” and
is not essential to the formation of publics.228 Many scholars have
noted the problems raised by “mixed” speech aimed at public contro223
See id. at 651 (“[T]he extension of First Amendment protection to commercial
speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech
provides.”).
224
Id.
225
Many mandated disclosures will require the commercial speaker to say something
contrary to the speaker’s interests and even, as in the case of the tobacco industry, to
disparage the speaker’s own product. This is not the kind of controversy that makes a
disclosure ideological. Rather, it is a controversy concerning the truth and relevance of
the disclosure itself. See, e.g., Cent. Ill. Light Co. v. Citizen Util. Bd., 827 F.2d 1169, 1173
(7th Cir. 1987) (striking down a regulation requiring public utilities to disseminate the
conflicting views of citizens’ boards, opining that Zauderer “does not suggest that companies can be made into involuntary solicitors for their ideological opponents”).
226
See id. (holding that “[t]he compelled distribution by the utilities to their customers
of messages created by CUB, and the forced assistance by the utilities in soliciting funds for
that opponent, are themselves violations of the First Amendment”).
227
See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637 (“‘[C]ommercial speech’ is entitled to the protection
of the First Amendment, albeit to protection somewhat less extensive than that afforded
‘noncommercial speech.’” (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60
(1983))). The Supreme Court has struck down laws that compel speech in noncommercial contexts. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (holding that the State of New
Hampshire could not require appellees with noncommercial vehicles to display the state
motto upon their vehicle license plates).
228
See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1
(2000). Post has more recently noted with some alarm the Court’s retreat from the
commercial-speech distinction and its nascent focus on the liberty interests of commercial
speakers. See Post, supra note 170, at 555.
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versies while at the same time selling products.229 The mixed speech
problem usually arises when government restricts the speech of commercial entities speaking on a matter of controversy—the regulated
entity has created mixed speech by engaging in public discourse.230
In the compelled commercial speech context, the problem emerges
in another way. Depending on the message compelled, the government itself may be the one creating mixed speech.231 The government
then uses its power over commercial speech to inject its own perspective into discursive public controversies.232
Disclosure as ideology takes its purest form where the facts disclosed are themselves evaluative facts embodying a contested norm.
This theory helps to explain Entertainment Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich,
in which the Seventh Circuit held unconstitutional a state law that
required video game retailers to affix a four-square-inch sticker reading “18” on any game statutorily deemed “sexually explicit.”233 The
court, in declining to apply Zauderer, found that the required disclosure was not “purely factual” but “opinion-based” because it forced
inclusion of “a subjective and highly controversial message—that the
game’s content is sexually explicit.”234 The problem here was not simply that the state was being normative. It is that the disclosed term—
“sexually explicit”—embodies contested subjective judgments, and
about First Amendment protected activities no less. The normative
interest in media exposure overwhelmed any informative interest in
labeling because the controversial norms constituted the “facts” to be
disclosed.235
The disclosure becomes ideological not only when the contested
norms constitute the facts to be disclosed but also when there is substantial controversy about the salience of the disclosed facts. In
229
See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Foreword, The Landmark Free-Speech
Case that Wasn’t: The Nike v. Kasky Story, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 1031 (2004) (discussing the gray area between corporations’ political statements and commercial statements);
Rebecca Tushnet, Fighting Freestyle: The First Amendment, Fairness, and Corporate Reputation, 50
B.C. L. REV. 1457, 1465–68 (2009) (explaining the difficult divide between commercial
and political speech as it relates to Nike).
230
See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67–68 (1983) (“The mailings
constitute commercial speech notwithstanding the fact that they contain discussions of important public issues such as venereal disease and family planning.”).
231
See, e.g., Royal, supra note 29, at 229–30 (stating that in Johans v. Livestock Marketing
Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005), the beef program that forced beef producers to fund advertisements that suggested beef was a generic product was constitutional because it was government speech).
232
See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 70–73 (holding that the government’s interests in and reasons for the statute, including protecting mail recipients from offensive matter and helping
parents control how their children discover information about topics like birth control,
were unconstitutional).
233
469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006).
234
Id.
235
See id. at 651–52.
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CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco, the district
court declined to apply Zauderer and enjoined a city mandate that cell
phone providers disclose the effective radiation of phones, along with
a graphic of a device releasing radiation.236 The decision, upheld by
the Ninth Circuit, found that the government was motivated by the
controversial belief that cell phone radiation was dangerous.237 The
controversy over the relevance of radiation to consumer purchases
meant that the disclosure could not be factual and uncontroversial.238
This kind of intrusion into a public controversy through the use of
mandatory disclosures is not just normative but ideological.239 Where
the government orders disclosures as a way to advance its side in a
controversial matter, the disclosure mandate bears greater constitutional scrutiny.240
A different view of the term “controversial” is that it concerns
only the existence of the facts disclosed, not their normative content
or relevance. In other words, “uncontroversial” is synonymous with
“factual.”241 Dayna Royal writes that a fact is uncontroverted if there is
consensus evidence to support the existence of the fact.242 Zauderer’s
lenient review, she argues, should apply to compelled disclosure of
“uncontroverted factual information,” and “[t]he question of whether
the fact is controverted . . . asks whether there is disagreement over
the fact’s truth, not whether there is disagreement over disclosing the
fact.”243
236
827 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded,
494 F. App’x 752 (9th Cir. 2012).
237
Id. at 1062.
238
Id. at 1063 (“[T]he image conveys a message that is neither factual nor uncontroversial, for cell phones have not been proven dangerous. The [images] are too much
opinion and too little fact.”).
239
This is the case when the state requires doctors performing abortions to “disclose”
sonograms to the pregnant patients, although this instance has the added dimension of a
captive audience. Robertson, supra note 9, at 347 (noting that state sonogram laws “are
motivated by a sentiment that if women are reminded that the fetus can be seen on ultrasound . . . they may hesitate in going forward with the abortion because of their ‘natural’
maternal feelings”); Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to
a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 377 (2008) (“[T]he ultrasound is meant to establish or simply to reinforce the state’s position that the fetus is not just ‘potential life,’ . . .
but ‘actual life,’ with all the ideological and emotional force that word now comprises and
exerts.”).
240
See Robertson, supra note 9, at 354 (explaining that some states, such as Texas and
Oklahoma, require physicians to provide additional information to women seeking abortions than other states do and that in these cases “the government will have to satisfy a
scrutiny stricter than that of undue burden”).
241
See Royal, supra note 29, at 242 (“If instead of requiring a disclosure of uncontroverted facts, a regulation compels disclosure of controverted facts, the regulation falls into
Category 2. . . . [This is] because this category compels messages that are not clearly
facts.”).
242
See id. at 237.
243
Id. at 236–37.
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This equation of “uncontroversial” and factual is problematic
from the consumer-autonomy standpoint. Consider these disclosure
mandates, all of which involve uncontroverted facts:
(1) Sugar content on nutritional label, so consumers can make informed choices and hopefully reduce sugar consumption.
(2) Sugar content on front of package, so consumers can make informed choices, hopefully reduce sugar consumption, and
make that their nutritional priority because of contested belief
that sugar consumption is the single most important nutritional
risk.
(3) Sugar content, with country of origin, so consumers can make
informed choices, and hopefully move manufacturers to rely
more heavily on domestic sugar.244

In Case 1, there is a norm at play, but the disclosure is uncontroversial
because the norm is uncontested (it is good to reduce sugar). The
government’s norms grow progressively more contested through
Cases 2 and 3, and its insistence on disclosure becomes less defensible
from a consumer-autonomy standpoint. Somewhere along this continuum, the normative agenda overwhelms the informative agenda
and more searching scrutiny would be warranted. The work that
“noncontroversial” does in the advancement of consumer-autonomy
interests is to impose a germaneness requirement on the state.245
Compelled-speech cases, like subsidized-speech cases, feature the state
as a participant in information markets, using its regulatory or spending power to get private parties to speak.246 In the subsidized-speech
area, courts have used germaneness as a limit on the state’s influence
over private communications.247 Limiting Zauderer review to instances
244
This would be distinct from other country-of-origin labeling mandates in that it
would not apply across the board to a product. See, e.g., The Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. § 70b (2012) (stating that “an imported textile fiber product” must
be labeled with “the name of the country where processed or manufactured”); The Wool
Products Labeling Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 68b (2012) (stating that a wool product is misbranded if it is not labeled with “the name of the country where processed or manufactured”). Rather, it would apply to a particular ingredient only, thus highlighting the fact
selectivity. Of course the selection of furs and textiles, and not metal and rubber, involved
a selection of facts at a more general level.
245
Germaneness worries are ameliorated to some extent at the federal level by delegated authority. The FDA, for example, issues labeling requirements only for “material”
statements and avoids warnings with respect to mild or idiosyncratic responses. 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(n) (2012).
246
Financing a public-sector union would inadvertently give the impression that an
employee supported public-sector unions. This financial support is similar to actually voicing support for public-sector unions. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 211
(1977) (discussing the constitutionality of legislation in Michigan that required “every employee represented by a union—even though not a union member” to pay the union even
if the employee did not support unions).
247
See United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 415 (2001) (striking down a subsidized speech law because “the expression respondent is required to support is not germane to a purpose related to an association independent from the speech itself”); Keller v.
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in which the mandated disclosure is of uncontroversial relevance to
consumer purchases would serve the same purpose.
Health risks are indisputably germane to tobacco use.248 It is also
uncontested that smoking is unhealthy and best avoided.249 Moreover, smokers themselves in large numbers wish that they could quit.250
By mandating cigarette labels, at least in their textual form, the state
neither used contested norms to create facts nor took a side in a controversy about the relevance of these facts.251 Similarly uncontroversial disclosures might include “seatbelts save lives” or “conserving
energy saves money.” By contrast, “conserving energy reduces the
risks of climate change” would be controversial. Whether it should be
or not, the concept of man-made climate change is currently an evaluative fact. What’s more, the choice to include that fact in any product
disclosure would be controverted as tendentious and irrelevant to
consumer purchases. A usable definition of “controversial” would
have to be worked out, as courts have worked out other standards
based on assessments of social consensus.252 Undoubtedly, it would
have to include a substantiality component that controlled for outlying opinions, as even a proposition such as “smoking kills” has its
detractors.
The question of whether a disclosure is controversial or not arises
only after we have determined that it is at least true. The R.J. Reynolds
State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 15 (1990) (holding impermissible State Bar’s use of government-mandated funds for “activities having political or ideological coloration which are
not reasonably related to the advancement” of the legal profession); Abood, 431 U.S. at 235
(holding union could not spend members’ funds on ideological speech “not germane to”
the duties giving rise to the necessity of the organization).
248
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/
data_statistics/sgr/2004/pdfs/chapter1.pdf.
249
See id. (discussing causal relationships between smoking and various health
problems).
250
In 2010, the National Health Interview Surveys compiled by the CDC indicated that
68.8% of adult smokers reported they wanted to quit smoking, while 52.4% said they had
attempted to quit within the past year. Ann Malarcher et al., Quitting Smoking Among
Adults—United States, 2001–2010, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1513, 1516 (Nov.
11, 2011).
251
See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012) (explaining cigarette labeling requirements mandated
by the U.S. government).
252
For instance, in order to establish guidelines for defining “obscenity,” the Supreme
Court replaced several competing definitions, including Justice Potter Stewart’s famously
amorphous articulation of the concept, with a new standard based on, among other factors, “contemporary community standards.” Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
Likewise, the phrase “cruel and unusual punishment” resists any easy definition. As the
Court has noted, “the words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and . . . their
scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01
(1958).
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majority found that the disclosures were untrue.253 This was due in
large part to the special indeterminacy of pictures and the power of
emotions.254 The charge of controversy, then, was bound up with a
view of the truthfulness of emotion and image. I examine this understanding below.
IV
EMOTIONS, TRUTH,

AND

COGNITIVE BYPASS

The previous Parts have dealt with the “ends” of a disclosure mandate, arguing that commercial disclosure may be autonomy enhancing even where the state is not combatting deception and has a
normative goal for behavioral change. Now we turn to the question of
means, asking whether the form of the disclosure—graphic and emotional—makes a constitutional difference. According to one narrative, the answer is decidedly yes.255 This is because of what the
Discount Tobacco dissent called the “inherently persuasive” character of
the “visual medium”256 and perhaps because these particular images
amounted to what the R.J. Reynolds court called “unabashed attempts
to evoke emotion . . . and browbeat consumers into quitting.”257 According to the other narrative, best articulated by the Discount Tobacco
majority, the depiction of facts in a visual medium does “not magically
turn such facts into opinions,” and facts and emotions are not at
odds.258
Each narrative is rooted in contestable assumptions about facticity, emotions, and the nature of manipulation. My purpose here is
not to prove that one or the other set of assumptions is correct but to
show that reflexively equating the emotional and manipulative with
the graphic and nonfactual is wrong. The questions of whether emotionally powerful disclosures bypass cognitive functions and whether
graphic images can be understood for their factual propositions are
empirical ones. In addressing these questions, with reference to the
253
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(“[M]any of the images chosen by FDA could be misinterpreted by consumers. . . . While
none of these images are patently false, they certainly do not impart purely factual, accurate, or uncontroversial information to consumers.”).
254
See id. at 1216 (noting that the images could be misinterpreted and that they were
“primarily intended to evoke an emotional response”).
255
See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 525–26 (6th
Cir. 2012) (Clay, J., partially dissenting) (discussing several cases that have distinguished
the constitutional treatment of textual messages from visual messages).
256
Id. at 526.
257
R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217; see also Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 529 (Clay, J., partially dissenting) (“[I]t is less clearly permissible for the government to simply frighten
consumers or to otherwise attempt to flagrantly manipulate the emotions of consumers as
it seeks to do here.”).
258
Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 569.
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research, I will put to one side the helpful points that consumers in all
cases have bounded rationality,259 particularly when they suffer from
chemical addictions.260 We can simply posit a background of perfect
rationality and autonomous choice against which the powerful disclosures act.
A. Manipulation and Rational Communication
Graphic and emotional communications, like any other speech,
can be manipulative and are best understood as communication without reason.261 Advertisers know that the most effective forms of communication activate emotions.262 Cigarette manufacturers in
particular have long excelled at making emotional connections between consumer and product.263 For just as long, they have been accused of “manipulation.”264 There is widespread agreement that
manipulation impairs autonomy.265 According to Joseph Raz’s influential work, to be the author of one’s life, one’s choices “must be free
from coercion and manipulation by others.”266 If the state bypasses
the consumer’s rational agency to advance the state’s own ends, this
would be disrespecting autonomy and acting manipulatively.267
259
See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 182, at 1439 (discussing bounded rationality
and manipulation).
260
See Sylvia A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 77 IOWA L. REV. 909, 946–47
(1992) (defining addiction for First Amendment purposes); c.f. Christine Jolls, Product
Warnings, Debiasing, and Free Speech: The Case of Tobacco Regulation, 169 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 53, 69 (2013) (discussing that smokers “have factual misperceptions
about the risk of death from a smoking-related illness”).
261
See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 182, at 1442–50 (discussing the role of atmospherics and visual displays in marketing and its effect on consumer behavior).
262
See STUART EWEN, CAPTAINS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: ADVERTISING AND THE SOCIAL ROOTS
OF THE CONSUMER CULTURE (1976); WILLIAM LEISS ET AL., SOCIAL COMMUNICATION IN ADVERTISING: PERSONS, PRODUCTS & IMAGES OF WELL-BEING (2d ed. 1990); TAMARA R. PIETY,
BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 108–20 (2012)
(examining various marketing techniques that she views as manipulating and enlarging
consumer appetites).
263
See, e.g., ROBERT SOBEL, THEY SATISFY: THE CIGARETTE IN AMERICAN LIFE 128–31
(1978) (describing tobacco advertising techniques); Michael E. Starr, The Marlboro Man:
Cigarette Smoking and Masculinity in America, J. OF POPULAR CULTURE, Spring 1984, at 45–56
(discussing the image of the smoker and cigarettes cultivated by popular culture and advertisers throughout American history).
264
See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, ADVERTISING, THE UNEASY PERSUASION 110 (1984).
265
See, e.g., PIETY, supra note 262, at 112–14 (discussing examples of marketers
manipulating consumers to act in predicable ways without their awareness of the marketers’ influence).
266
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 372–73 (1980).
267
I want to set aside the arguments that even this kind of manipulation might not be
paternalistic in the context of an addictive substance like tobacco because the addicted
consumer is incapable of exercising rational choice.
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But what exactly characterizes manipulation is surprisingly undertheorized.268 Seana Shiffrin’s influential view is that one is autonomous, and therefore not manipulated, when one reasons for
oneself.269 In the First Amendment context, David Strauss identifies
the harm of government speech restrictions as “a denial of [listener]
autonomy in the sense that they interfere with a person’s control over
her own reasoning processes.”270 It follows from this that a disclosure
requirement that tries to get a consumer to do something by depriving him of the ability to reason for himself would be autonomy reducing.271 What kind of communication would this be?
Strauss, like other theorists, equates manipulation with lying, suggesting that manipulative speech is that which causes a false belief.272
The intentional inculcation of false beliefs shreds reason.273 When a
speaker lies in order to get you to do something, she has manipulated.
On that, most everyone can agree.274 C. Edwin Baker, the towering
First Amendment autonomy theorist, called “manipulative lies” an “attempt to undermine the integrity of the other person’s decisionmaking authority.”275 The operation of a lie—depriving the recipient of
truthful information—moves the speech to the margins of what Jorgen Habermas called a “communicative act.”276 Drawing on the work
268
Cf. RAZ, supra note 266, at 377–78 (discussing briefly the concept of manipulation
and drawing distinctions between coercion and manipulation).
269
See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 220 (2000).
270
Strauss, supra note 59, at 354; see also id. at 355 (“The persuasion principle . . .
prohibits the government from deliberately denying information to people for the purpose
of influencing their behavior.”).
271
Danny Scoccia, The Right to Autonomy and the Justification of Hard Paternalism, in PATERNALISM THEORY AND PRACTICE 74, 77 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2013)
(noting that “autonomy enhancement” is an intervention “when others are about to make
substantially ‘impaired’ . . . choices, to remove the impairment so that their choices will be
more autonomous”).
272
At other points in his work, Strauss seems to embrace a broader definition of manipulation that is nearly indistinguishable from persuasion. See Strauss, supra note 59, at
362 (“Every speaker who tries to gain an advantage by using his or her superior resources
(including intellectual and rhetorical abilities as well as material resources), instead of just
offering the arguments for what they are worth on the merits, is engaged in a form of
manipulation.”).
273
See also Jeremy Waldron, Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of Freedom, 62
S. CAL. L. REV. 1097, 1118–19 (1989) (criticizing Raz for saying so little about manipulation
and concluding that “in the end[,] Raz will want to settle for a fairly modest idea of manipulation which involves something as simple as the inculcation of false beliefs”).
274
See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 266, at 377–78 (manipulation “perverts the way that person
reaches decisions, forms preferences or adopts goals”); Fallon, supra note 69, at 889 (manipulation is “a perversion of someone’s thinking, deciding, or acting”); Claudia Mills,
Politics and Manipulation, 21 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 97, 97–112 (1995) (defining manipulation as using bad reasons to persuade).
275
C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 256 (2011).
276
1 J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 85–95 (Thomas McCarthy
trans., 1984) (distinguishing communicative action from forms of “strategic action” where
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of Thomas Emerson, Baker distinguished lies from autonomy-respecting persuasion because the latter “operate[s] through the mind of the
other and thereby gives the other at least the theoretical possibility of
rejecting the message or giving it her own chosen significance.”277
Manipulation akin to deception might also result from material
omissions of relevant information278 or the source of information.279
Other examples would include subliminal messages designed to penetrate the mind without notice.280 In all these cases, the source of persuasion is intentionally concealed.
Speech may be manipulative because of the way that it plays on
emotion, even if it does not create false belief. If the concept of manipulation were limited to inculcating a false belief, then there would
be no difference between manipulation and deception.281 Suppose
an employee breaks his leg (A) and then intentionally exploits his
boss’s sympathy in order to take long lunches (B). The employee has
not created false belief, but he may have manipulated by exploiting
sympathy for A to gain permissiveness for B. He has in a sense created
a false emotion around B. Robert Noggle addresses this situation by
defining manipulation not only as the creation of false belief but as
the “leading astray” from ideal states of feeling.282 He asserts that the
subject has an ideal state of “feeling” when having an appropriate
the speech is designed to get someone to act, rather than merely to reach an
understanding).
277
Baker, supra note 275, at 258; see also THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION (1970).
278
See JOEL FEINBERG, 3 MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF 12–16
(1986) (asserting that choices which come from ignorance are not fully autonomous
choices).
279
Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83,
108–12 (2006) (identifying forms of deceptive communications).
280
Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust
and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L. J. 713, 749 (1997) (“Subliminal ads . . . bypass
the viewer’s conscious mind entirely and lodge in the subconscious as fully formed and
conclusory thoughts. They are, therefore, inconsistent with the goal of rational consumer
choice and should be condemned as an unfair consumer practice.” By contrast,
“[a]ssociational advertising may fuel consumer desires that are every bit as irrational as
those induced by subliminal messages. Nonetheless, those ads do not inevitably prevent
the operation of the consumers’ critical facilities. If the consumers choose to set those
facilities aside—or, perhaps more accurately, if they choose to value psychological attributes of the product as well as, and perhaps more highly than, its physical characteristics—
this is a decision that market advocates must respect.”).
281
Robert Noggle, Manipulative Actions: A Conceptual and Moral Analysis, 33 AM. PHIL.
Q. 43, 43–55 (1996).
282
Id. at 46 (defining manipulation as inducing a violation of certain “ideals” about
how beliefs, desires, and emotions should relate to reality); see also Patricia Greenspan, The
Problem with Manipulation, 40 AM. PHIL. Q. 155, 157 (2003) (defining manipulation as “a
kind of unfairness in setting up the terms of social exchange” involving especially a breach
of trust).
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emotional reaction.283 A manipulator provokes an inappropriate
emotional reaction by drawing the target away from “relevant
information.”284
Under either a narrow view of manipulation as deception or a
broader view embracing more subtle forms of direction, we are left to
consider the nature of reality and therefore what information is faithful and relevant to that reality. Where a speaker seeks to inculcate
true beliefs and support rational decision making on the basis of relevant feeling, the speech will not be manipulative. When it comes to
the cigarette labels and other forms of graphic disclosure, the right
question is not whether the speaker intentionally activates emotional
responses but whether the speaker intentionally uses emotions to distort or bypass rational choice.
B. Emotionality and Cognitive Bypass
There is no question that the graphic cigarette labels were developed to provoke emotional response in order to “enhance the effective communication of the health warning message.”285 The textual
warning labels had become “unnoticed and stale.”286 By contrast, the
graphic labels that had been adopted in Canada more than a decade
before seemed to do a better job of delivering health information that
would be absorbed by smokers and potential smokers.287 Whether or
not the graphic warnings ultimately reduce smoking, they seem to increase awareness of its risks, especially among younger consumers288

283
This conception of “appropriate” emotions assumes that emotions are the byproducts of appraisals of reality. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Klaus R. Scherer, Appraisal Processes
in Emotion, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 572, 572 (Richard J. Davidson et al. eds.,
2003) (“[E]motions arise from [people’s] perceptions of their circumstances—immediate,
imagined, or remembered.”).
284
See Noggle, supra note 281, at 52.
285
Final Rule, supra note 1, at 36,641.
286
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Rogers, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
287
Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 565 (6th Cir.
2012) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Surveys in Canada . . . show
that approximately 95 percent of youth smokers and 75 percent of adult smokers report
that the pictorial warnings have been effective in providing them with important health
information. And Canadian smokers were more likely to report cigarette packages as a
source of information about health risks of smoking than smokers in the United States or
other countries with only textual warnings.” (citations omitted) (internal quotaition marks
omitted)).
288
PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH CONSORTIUM, EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF PICTURE
HEALTH WARNINGS ON CIGARETTE PACKETS 3 (2010).
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and less literate consumers.289 Shock helps to overcome resistance
and apathy.290
For critics of the labels, the state bypassed the head by speaking
to the heart and, by scaring, ceased to inform.291 Nat Stern argues
that the images cannot be factual because of “the emotional appeal
inherent” in the communication.292 If indeed there is a graphic alchemy at work, converting facts to fiction, then a disclosure justified
by consumer-autonomy interests might actually reduce autonomy by
leading listeners astray into irrational or emotionally inappropriate reactions.293 This concern is not borne out by the experimental literature, which shows that emotionally powerful warnings can trigger fear
and disgust while simultaneously working on a cognitive level.294
Social scientists, particularly in the fields of social and cognitive
psychology, have been studying the interaction of cognition and emotion (also described as “affect”) since the 1950s.295 In recent years,
the topic has attracted fresh attention in other fields, including politi289
James F. Thrasher et al., Cigarette Warning Label Policy Alternatives and Smoking-Related
Health Disparities, 43 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 590, 595, 597–98 (2012) (reporting on experiment exposing nearly one thousand adult smokers to FDA graphic labels and finding that
pictorial-warning labels were rated as more personally relevant, effective, and credible than
text-only labels among participants with low health literacy).
290
See Final Rule, supra note 1, at 36,641 (“The overall body of scientific evidence
indicates that health warnings that evoke strong emotional responses enhance an individual’s ability to process the warning information, leading to increased knowledge and
thoughts about the harms of cigarettes and the extent to which the individual could personally experience a smoking-related disease. Increased knowledge and thoughts about
the negative consequences of smoking, in turn, are reasonably likely to result in more
informed and healthier behaviors, such as trying to quit smoking or deciding not to
start.”). But c.f. George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, We Can Do this the Easy Way or the
Hard Way: Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 190, 200–01
(2006) (critiquing regulatory strategies that use fear appeals because they impose “psychic
costs” on consumers without necessarily changing behavior, thereby making people worse
off).
291
Nat Stern & Mark J. Stern, Advancing an Adaptive Standard of Strict Scrutiny for Content-Based Commercial Speech Regulation, 47 U. RICH. L. REV 1171, 1194–95 (2013) (describing
the images used on cigarette cartons as evoking emotions, including fright, instead of stating a fact).
292
Id. For Stern, any kind of persuasion is “propaganda” that undermines consumer
autonomy and the emotionality of the message is what changes it from “this is what smoking does” to “do not smoke.” Id. at 1195, 1199.
293
This is the concern expressed by the dissenting judge in Discount Tobacco that emotional appeals “subsumes rationale [sic] decision-making.” Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery,
Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 529 (Clay, J., partially dissenting) (citing the government’s argument).
294
See, e.g., Leonie Huddy & Anna. H. Gunnthorsdottir, The Persuasive Effects of Emotive
Visual Imagery: Superficial Manipulation or the Product of Passionate Reason?, 21 POL. PSYCHOL.
745, 748 (2000) (citing research demonstrating that affect and cognition are closely
interwoven).
295
See, e.g., Daniel Katz & Ezra Stotland, A Preliminary Statement to a Theory of Attitude
Structure and Change, in 3 PSYCHOLOGY: A STUDY OF A SCIENCE 423, 423–24 (Sigmund Koch
ed., 1959) (outlining a functional approach to how attitudes affect individuals).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-3\crn301.txt

2014]

unknown

VISUAL GUT PUNCH

Seq: 49

25-FEB-14

12:44

561

cal science,296 law,297 and neuroscience.298 As Jeremy Blumenthal has
written, there is no experimental consensus on “the nature and phenomenology of emotions, as well as about the processes by which emotion affects, influences, interacts with, controls, or is subject to, more
‘rational’ cognitive processes.”299
On one theory, emotions spread without mediation engage us immediately and holistically, and often stimulate a visceral and unthinking response.300 An early model of visual and emotional
communication posited that individuals simply transfer emotions
from an emotionally laden visual (such as a flower) to an emotionally
neutral object (such as a bar of soap).301 According to this affecttransfer model, the image transmits a value that is passively absorbed,
without much interpretive activity by the viewer.302 As Rebecca
Tushnet has shown, judges frequently assume this model of communication in their discussion of visual images.303
296
See, e.g., W. RUSSELL NEUMAN ET AL., THE AFFECT EFFECT: DYNAMICS OF EMOTION IN
POLITICAL THINKING AND BEHAVIOR 1 (W. Russell Neuman et al. eds., 2007) (citing “a resurgent interest in the way emotion interacts with thinking about politics”); Ted Brader, The
Political Relevance of Emotions:“Reassessing” Revisited, 32 POL. PSYCHOL. 337, 337 (2011) (citing
to current theories of assessing emotions and “[a] surge in research on emotions in political psychology”); Linda M. Isbell et al., Affect and Politics: Effects on Judgment, Processing, and
Information Seeking, in FEELING POLITICS: EMOTION IN POLITICAL INFORMATION PROCESSING
57, 85 (David P. Redlawsk ed., 2006) (describing how “affect influences judgment, information processing, and information seeking in different ways” depending on mood and
level of situational awareness).
297
See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94
MINN. L. REV. 1997, 1998 (2010) (“Law and emotions scholarship has reached a critical
moment in its trajectory.”); Richard L. Wiener et al., Emotion and the Law: A Framework for
Inquiry, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 231 (2006) (“Although the study of affect and motivation in information processing models has captured the attention of many who think about
social cognition, judgment, and decision making, the impact of this thinking has only begun to make its way into research and theory in legal psychology.” (citations omitted)).
298
Charles S. Carver, Negative Affects Deriving from the Behavioral Approach System, 4 EMOTION 3, 3 (2004) (describing the “increasing interest in theoretical links from neurobiological systems to motivation, emotion, personality, and psychopathology”).
299
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 n.4 (2007)
(citing HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES (Richard J. Davidson et al. eds., 2003); THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS (Paul Ekman & Richard J. Davidson eds.,
1994)).
300
See, e.g., Brader, supra note 296, at 340–41 (arguing that anxiety may trigger reconsideration of past choices); Huddy & Gunnthorsdottir, supra note 294, at 748 (arguing an
affective symbol can influence emotions, acting as a source of persuasion independent of
rationality).
301
See Linda M. Scott, Images in Advertising: The Need for a Theory of Visual Rhetoric, 21 J.
CONSUMER RES. 252, 256–57 (1994) (discussing theories and studies concerning visual
communications); see also Huddy & Gunnthorsdottir, supra note 294, at 747–48 (providing
an overview of the affect-transfer and information processing paradigms).
302
See Scott, supra note 301, at 256 (explaining that images used in advertisements act
“to produce an attachment to the brand in a manner that is automatic, affective, or unconscious (or all of these at once)”).
303
See Rebecca Tushnet, Worth A Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 683, 690–91, 694 (2012) (explaining that judges distinguish images from words in

R
R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-3\crn301.txt

562

unknown

Seq: 50

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

25-FEB-14

12:44

[Vol. 99:513

More recent research in risk communication challenges this
older model, demonstrating that emotional communication does not
bypass the cognitive.304 Rather, the emotional provocation activates
cognition—heart stimulating head—to more effectively communicate.305 A more complex model of emotional appeals is emerging
whereby the provocation triggers both emotional and cognitive responses in an integrated fashion.306 For example, a communication
may evoke a feeling of anxiety, which then prompts a quest for, and
receptivity to, factual information.307 Contemporary theories of emotion such as hot cognition theory,308 the affect-infusion model,309 and
affect-as-information theory310 similarly suggest that emotional and intellectual processing are interlinked. The same insight animates re-

part on the assumption that individuals are more subconsciously affected by images); see
also Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65 TENN. L.
REV. 1, 15 (1997) (describing law’s treatment of emotions as visceral and unmediated).
304
Huddy & Gunnthorsdottir, supra note 296, at 749 (“There is growing acknowledgment among psychologists and researchers of political behavior . . . that reactions to an
emotive symbol may not be as superficial or devoid of cognition as once thought.”).
305
See, e.g., Julie A. Edell & Marian Chapman Burke, The Power of Feelings in Understanding Advertising Effects, 14 J. OF CONS. RES. 421, 431 (1987) (finding that affect can influence
cognition); Francine Rosselli et al., Processing Rational and Emotional Messages: The Cognitive
and Affective Mediation of Persuasion, 31 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 163, 183–84 (1995)
(discussing experimental findings that emotionally based communication is mediated by
cognitive and emotional responses).
306
See Maria Miceli et al., Emotional and Non-Emotional Persuasion, 20 APPLIED ARTIFICAL
INTELLIGENCE 849, 855–56 (2006) (arguing that emotional persuasion is not necessarily
irrational persuasion).
307
Huddy & Gunnthorsdottir, supra note 296, at 749; see also Brader, supra note 296,
339 & n.2 (citing numerous studies showing the existence of “an exogenous, and at times
interactive, effect of anxiety and other emotions” that contrast with the affect transfer
hypothesis).
308
In political psychology, the hot cognition theory posits “that all sociopolitical concepts are affect laden.” Milton Lodge & Charles S. Taber, The Automaticity of Affect for Political Leaders, Groups, and Issues: An Experimental Test of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis, 26 POL.
PSYCHOL. 455, 456 (2005) (providing an overview of recent research on the hot cognition
hypothesis).
309
Joseph P. Forgas, Mood and Judgment: The Affect Infusion Model (AIM), 117 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 39, 39 (1995) (proposing an affect infusion model “whereby affectively loaded information exerts an influence on and becomes incorporated into the judgmental process,
entering into the [individual’s] deliberations and eventually coloring the judgmental
outcome”).
310
Gerald L. Clore & Maya Tamir, Affect as Embodied Information, 13 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY
37, 37 (2002) (“[W]hen affect enters into judgments and decisions, it does so directly
through the information embodied in affective feelings and only indirectly by activating
positive or negative thoughts.”); Norbert Schwarz & Gerald L. Clore, Mood, Misattribution,
and Judgments of Well-Being: Informative and Directive Functions of Affective States, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 513, 513, 520 (1983) (introducing the affect-as-information theory,
suggesting that emotions provide information and affect how individuals process life
satisfaction).
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cent philosophical inquiries into the nature of emotions and their
dependence on cognition.311
If emotional and cognitive pathways crisscross, then the mere fact
that the speaker has used an emotional provocation does not mean
that he has led the target away from true beliefs or relevant information, or otherwise subverted the target’s rational agency. It is equally
likely that the emotional provocation has sharpened the cognitive
profile of true and relevant facts.312 Experimental findings in
tobacco-risk-communication research support a “dual-process” theory
whereby emotional image and text together increase the salience of
warnings about the effects of smoking.313 The emotional impact of
the graphic cigarette warnings, rather than diluting or distorting
health information, may deepen understanding of that
information.314
The contrary notion—that there is a stark difference between rational and emotional communication—is at odds with First Amendment protections. Arguments for restrictions on speech grounded on
differences between emotional and rational speech have failed, with
courts granting both kinds of communication equal status.315 Martin
Redish has argued against differential treatment of emotional speech
not only because of its equal status but also because the “emotional
element” and “ ‘non-rational’ forms of communication” serve to develop the more rational forms.316 In other words, the emotions and
the mind are codependent.
C. Graphic Communication and Truth
Whether an image hijacks or supports consumer decision making
depends ultimately on its relationship to the truth. In the language of
311

See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMO4 (2001) (arguing that emotions are built on “cognitive appraisal or evaluation”
(emphasis omitted)).
312
See Huddy & Gunnthorsdottir, supra note 296, at 749 (citing research finding that
anxiety may motivate an individual to search for additional factual information).
313
Lydia F. Emery et al., Affective and Cognitive Mediators of the Impact of Cigarette Warning
Labels, NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES., Aug. 2013, at 5.
314
Jolls, supra note 260, at 58 (“[T]here is sound empirical evidence . . . that individuals’ risk perceptions attain greater factual accuracy with a text-image warning than with a
text-only alternate.”).
315
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (“Speech is powerful. It can
stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—
inflict great pain.”); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (noting that “words are
often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force” and that the “emotive
function” of speech “may often be the more important element of the overall message
sought to be communicated”); see also Ellen P. Goodman, Peer Promotions and False Advertising Law, 58 S.C. L. Rev. 683, 691 (2007) (showing that emotionally evocative “lifestyle”
advertising is as protected as informational advertising).
316
Redish, supra note 57, at 628.
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Zauderer, this is the question of whether graphic communication can
be “purely factual.” This is by far the most difficult question posed by
the cigarette labels.317 Answering the question requires content analysis that courts find difficult.318 Moreover, the inquiry is complicated
by the dual meaning of the word “factual” that emerges from the tobacco labeling experiment. A fact can be (1) a provable thing or (2) a
substantially true thing (or both). If images are held to be factual only
if they are provable, the indeterminacy of the visual image will undercut its facticity.319
The R.J. Reynolds court seems to have understood factual to mean
provable rather than true.320 The graphic labels could not be considered factual in large part because they were multivalent and did not
stand for a single provable assertion.321 Different viewers are likely to
read the images differently, finding meanings that diverge from the
accompanying text.322 It is often the case that images communicate
many meanings at once.323 As visual studies and psychology literatures have shown, image interpretation is variable and influenced by
the viewer’s socioeconomic and cultural characteristics.324 The indeterminacy of images means that it is difficult to isolate a single set of
facts that can be proved or disproved. It is for this reason that images
are rarely sanctioned as “false” in false advertising law.325
317

Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
For instance, when it comes to false advertising, “the difficulty of pinning down an
image’s meaning in order to determine whether that image makes a false claim has . . . led
courts to state, rather than explain, their conclusions.” Rebecca Tushnet, Looking at the
Lanham Act: Images in Trademark and Advertising Law, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 861, 917 (2011).
319
See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (reiterating that misleading and false commercial
speech may be restricted by the state or federal government); see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (finding graphic images on
cigarette packaging could be misinterpreted and therefore could not impart factual and
accurate information to consumers).
320
R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217 (“While none of these images are patently false, they
certainly do not impart purely factual, accurate, or uncontroversial information.”).
321
See id. at 1216–17 (finding the graphic images used on cigarette packaging did not
convey a clear message, the lack of which could result in consumer misinterpretation).
322
See Tushnet, supra note 318, at 865 (describing images as “protean”).
323
See Jane McKenzie & Christine van Winkelen, Beyond Words: Visual Metaphors that
Can Demonstrate Comprehension of KM as a Paradoxical Activity System, 28 SYS. RES. & BEHAV.
SCI. 138, 141–42 (2011) (“Visual imagery produces meaning in different ways to language.
Unlike words, visual objects do not have a unified stable meaning in the mind of the
viewer; meaning is created fluidly in movement and dialogue between the image, the author, the view and the circumstances of perception.” (citations omitted)).
324
See, e.g., TERENCE WRIGHT, VISUAL IMPACT: CULTURE AND THE MEANING OF IMAGES
35–37 (2008) (discussing how cultural knowledge can be needed to achieve a basic perception of an image).
325
See Linda J. Demaine, Seeing Is Deceiving: The Tacit Deregulation of Deceptive Advertising,
54 ARIZ. L. REV. 719 (2012) (arguing that courts have left visual imagery largely unregulated in modern advertising law).
318
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If an image, to be factual, must make a unitary and provable assertion, it will usually fail. This is what we see in a judicial assessment
of the image called “man with chest staples” accompanied by the text,
“smoking can kill you.”326

According to the R.J. Reynolds district court decision, this is not factual
unless we think the government is claiming that smoking causes autopsies.327 Christine Jolls criticizes the lower court’s depiction of the
consumer as “relentlessly literal and logical (smoking must cause autopsies if the image depicts an autopsy).”328 In its search for a unitary
and provable message, the court first imagines that the takeaway
meaning for the consumer is “autopsy” rather than “death.” Then it
imagines the consumer unable to associate the words and the
picture.329
This is a rather limited, and unsupported, understanding of visual processing. The FDA contracted for the largest ever study (18,000
participants) of reactions to graphic warnings in order to test the impact of this image on a wide range of consumers against a test group
that viewed the textual warning only.330 In addition, this image was
tested against other possible images paired with the same text.

326
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1217 (finding that while images approved by
the Final Rule, including the “man with chest staples,” were not “patently false, they certainty [did] not impart purely factual, accurate, or uncontroversial information to
consumers”).
327
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 273 (D.D.C. 2012); see also
R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217 (“While none of these images are patently false, they certainly do not impart purely factual, accurate, or uncontroversial information to consumers
. . . .”).
328
See Jolls, supra note 260, at 57 (internal quotation marks omitted).
329
See R.J. Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 273.
330
See JAMES NONNEMAKER ET AL., EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF GRAPHIC CIGARETTE WARNING LABELS, FINAL RESULTS REPORT 3–26 (2010), available at http://www.regulations.gov/
contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480bad0e1&disposition=attachment&content
Type=pdf.
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The purpose was to study the effect of the graphic images on consumer attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and intended behaviors.331 The
study concluded that the chosen “man with chest staples” image
scored highest among the alternatives, and against the control, on a
combination of emotional, cognitive, and recall measures.332 The
study did not ask respondents what message they took away from the
graphics.333 What it assessed was recall of the text message that
“smoking can kill you,” providing an account of at least one meaning
that consumers associated with the graphic.334 Whether they associated other meanings with the graphic is unknown.335
Some commentators were concerned that the pictured body gave
a false impression of health because it did not “look worse (e.g., paler,
weaker, thinner, like he had suffered more).”336 Others worried “that
persons unfamiliar with an autopsy may not understand the image.”337
The FDA responded that, given the accompanying text, “[v]iewers will
understand that the image shows someone who has died from a smoking-related cause” and that not all smoking-related diseases ravage the
visible body.338 In other words, the image was substantially true.339
The meaning of factual as being substantially true rather than
one provable thing is the only meaning of factual that even textual
warnings could satisfy.340 Consider the textual warning “smoking
causes heart disease.” This is only true some of the time. The declarative statement might lead consumers to believe that it is true all of the
time or more of the time than is the case.341 Indeed, the tobacco
industry claimed that the graphic images were untrue because they
331
The model was built on the theory that increasing the salience of a message by
provoking emotional and cognitive responses will result in longer recall and behavioral
change. Id. at 1–2 (“Eliciting strong emotional and cognitive reactions to the graphic cigarette warning label enhances recall and processing of the health warning, which helps
ensure that the warning is better processed, understood, and remembered. . . . As attitudes and beliefs change, they eventually lead to changes in intentions to quit/start smoking and then later to lower smoking initiation and successful cessation.”).
332
Id. at 3–26.
333
Id. at 1–3.
334
Id. at 1-1 to 1-3.
335
Id. at 1-3.
336
Final Rule, supra note 1, at 36,655.
337
Id.
338
Id.
339
Id.; accord R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(Rogers, J., dissenting) (“An autopsy scar is merely one way of communicating that the
man in the image is dead; viewed in connection with the textual warning, the image conveys the message that smoking can result in death.”).
340
See Final Rule, supra note 1, at 36,631 (describing likely health consequences caused
by cigarette smoking).
341
See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216 (“[M]any of the images chosen by the FDA could
be misinterpreted by consumers.”).
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did not depict probabilities.342 A substantial truth standard forgives
this elision, allowing for a (small) range of plural interpretations.343
How courts consider the free speech consequences of graphic disclosures is important because graphic labels seem to communicate
more effectively than textual ones.344 Research conducted on food
labeling shows that graphics are more successful than text in conveying nutritional information, especially to less educated populations.345
Color-coded “traffic light” systems that label food as red (“unhealthy”), green (“healthy”), or yellow (“so-so”) work better than detailed text.346 Even though a color code is neither especially
emotional nor figurative, it does raise the same questions as the tobacco labels about substantial truth and multivalent meanings.347 An
understanding of factual that insists on single provable assertions and
that is hostile to the use of complex emotional-cognitive pathways will
leave little room for more effective forms of communication.
CONCLUSION
The graphic tobacco labels push buttons that no American disclosure mandate has ever approached. They pose the question of how
emotionally charged images change the free speech implications of
342
See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 559–60 (6th
Cir. 2012) (discussing and rejecting industry arguments on probabilities). Because images
are less susceptible to qualification, they are more vulnerable to criticism that they have
exaggerated risks. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases,
and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 82 (2002) (“[V]ivid images and concrete pictures of disaster can
‘crowd out’ other kinds of thoughts, including the crucial thought that the probability of
disaster is very small.”).
343
For such an approach, see R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1231 (Rogers, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he relevant question [is] . . . whether the images render the overall message conveyed
by the warning labels nonfactual.” (emphasis in original)).
344
Final Rule, supra note 1, at 36,631–32.
345
See generally Lucas, supra note 9, at 256–57 (discussing studies of the effectiveness of
graphic warnings on food labels); see also INST. OF MED., FRONT-OF-PACKAGE NUTRITION RATING SYSTEMS AND SYMBOLS: PROMOTING HEALTHIER CHOICES 67–68 (Ellen A. Wartella et al.
eds., 2012) (reviewing studies examining front-of-package labeling systems); Kristy L.
Hawley et al., The Science on Front-of-Package Food Labels, 16 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 430, 432
(2012) (discussing effect on consumers of graphic expression of percentage daily value).
346
Several recent studies have demonstrated the informational effects of a store foodlabeling system that uses color codes to communicate the relative healthiness of foods. See
Hawley et al., supra note 345, at 433–34 (reporting on study showing color codes easiest to
understand); Anne M. Thorndike et al., A 2-Phase Labeling and Choice Architecture Intervention
to Improve Healthy Food and Beverage Choices, 102 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 527, 531–32 (2012)
(reporting on study showing that color-coded food labels reduced unhealthy food sales
and increased healthy food sales).
347
Were the government to adopt mandatory labels of this sort, it would probably fall
into the category of “controversial” addressed above. The determination of “health” is so
multivalent, it is hard to imagine a consensus on the designation.

R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-3\crn301.txt

568

unknown

Seq: 56

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

25-FEB-14

12:44

[Vol. 99:513

disclosures that have been in place for fifty years.348 The D.C. Circuit,
in R.J. Reynolds, decided that the images made a world of difference,
exposing a normativity and subjectivity at odds with factual communication.349 There is little scholarship on compelled commercial
speech, much less on the communicative impact of particular forms of
disclosure. This gap in the theory is evident in the doctrine. The first
constitutional challenge to graphic labels has resulted in new doctrine
that misconceives visual and emotional processing and overstates distinctions between the normative and informative, the emotional and
the cognitive.350
Faced with the difficult First Amendment questions that graphic
disclosures present, two circuit courts diverged on questions of facticity and deception, emotions and persuasion. R.J. Reynolds had the final word, concluding that the new warnings were not entitled to
rational basis review on two independent grounds: a) that they did not
correct otherwise deceptive advertising, and b) that they were not
“purely factual” in large part because of emotional, indefinite, and
persuasive messages.351 Although the labels had been chosen for
their communicative impact, they were judged under more searching
scrutiny for their impact on consumer behavior—a secondary goal
that the government could not show it had achieved.352 Under that
interpretation of the law, the old textual warnings—which have never
been challenged—should also receive heightened scrutiny and would
probably fail. Many other mandated product disclosures (nutritional
information, energy efficiency) would be similarly suspect.353 Indeed,
new challenges are already underway, for example to country-of-origin
labeling on meat.354
Disclosure requirements often will, like the cigarette labels, serve
dual goals: to inform consumer choices and to influence them.355
This is particularly true in the case of warnings.356 As the Court and
many commentators have noted, commercial speech law is designed
348
Compare Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 518 (6th
Cir. 2012) (upholding statutory labeling requirement on facial challenge), with R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1221–22 (striking down labels adopted by Food and Drug Administration).
349
R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216.
350
See id. at 1219.
351
Id. at 1216.
352
Id. at 1219–21.
353
See, e.g., Nat’l Elec. Mfg. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 116 (applying rational basis
review to a state law requiring light bulb manufacturers to disclose mercury content).
354
See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 13-CV-1033 (KBJ), 2013 WL 4830778
(D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2013).
355
See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 10, at 649–50.
356
See, e.g., Final Rule, supra note 1, at 36,631–32 (“On the basis of the available scientific evidence, the IOM concluded that larger, graphic warnings would promote greater
public knowledge of the health risks of using tobacco and would help reduce
consumption.”).
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to vindicate listener interests.357 Fidelity to these interests does not
require courts to disentangle state goals to inform and influence or to
disfavor a communication because it persuades.358 Persuasion, in the
absence of manipulation, is not autonomy reducing, even if it is emotionally charged. Communications research shows that emotions facilitate “knowing.” Emotional and cognitive processing is collaborative,
not oppositional.359
While the cigarette labels should have been treated more deferentially, dangers do lurk in the compelled commercial speech area.
Disputes about what is factual and objective communication can obscure the more important question of when mandated disclosures subvert listener interests. The listener interests that commercial speech
law protects include interests in a public discourse free from undue
state interference. When the state uses its regulatory powers over
commercial speech to build an ideological platform, those listener interests are compromised. It is uncontroversial that the message
“smoking kills,” however delivered, is relevant to a consumer choice.
The salience of many other messages (even if purely factual) will be
subject to heated public debate. I argue that this distinction, far more
than emotionality or normativity, has constitutional meaning.
Another danger in compelled commercial speech that the cigarette labels might pose—but that could not be seen for the focus on
emotionality—is that the mandated disclosure is unduly burdensome
for the speaker.360 Listener interests and speaker burden, rather than
arid classifications of speech, should be the focus of the constitutional
analysis.

357
See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 762–65 (1976) (detailing various consumer interests in free flow of commercial
information).
358
See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 535 (6th Cir.
2012).
359
See Rosselli et al., supra note 305, at 184.
360
See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 417 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
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